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Jason D. Hartline

Name: dblp XML data dump
Creator: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz Center for Informatics
Published: 1993
License: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
Keywords: dblp, XML, computer science, scholarly publications, metadata

◀ ▶ joint publications with Nima Haghpanah

> Home > Persons > Jason D. Hartline

Publications

2021
[j24]
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  - journals/jet/FuHHK21
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  - https://dblp.org/rec/journals/jet/FuHHK21
Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg:
Full surplus extraction from samples. J. Econ. Theory 193: 105230 (2021)
2019
[j18]
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  - journals/mor/AlaeiFHHM19
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  - https://dblp.org/rec/journals/mor/AlaeiFHHM19
Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian:
Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms. Math. Oper. Res. 44(3): 1058-1086 (2019)
2015
[c47]
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  dblp key:
  - conf/sigecom/HaghpanahH15
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  - https://dblp.org/rec/conf/sigecom/HaghpanahH15
Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline:
Reverse Mechanism Design. EC 2015: 757-758
2014
[c46]
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  - conf/sigecom/FuHHK14
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Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg:
Optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling. EC 2014: 23-36
[i18]
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  dblp key:
  - journals/corr/HaghpanahH14
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Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline:
Reverse Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1404.1341 (2014)
[i15]
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  - journals/corr/FuHHK14
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Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg:
Optimal Auctions for Correlated Buyers with Sampling. CoRR abs/1406.1571 (2014)
2013
[c43]
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  dblp key:
  - conf/focs/AlaeiFHH13
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Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline:
The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions. FOCS 2013: 628-637
2012
[c38]
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  - conf/sigecom/AlaeiFHHM12
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Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian:
Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction. EC 2012: 17
[i11]
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  - journals/corr/abs-1203-5099
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Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian:
Bayesian Optimal Auctions via Multi- to Single-agent Reduction. CoRR abs/1203.5099 (2012)
[i10]
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  dblp key:
  - journals/corr/abs-1206-3541
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Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian:
The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions. CoRR abs/1206.3541 (2012)

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