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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 103
Volume 103, May 2017
- Ehud Kalai, Marco Battaglini

, Gary Charness, Vincent P. Crawford
, Françoise Forges, David C. Parkes, Jennifer Byrd:
Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special Issue. 1-18 - Carlos Alós-Ferrer

, Klaus Ritzberger:
Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection? 19-29 - Vincent Anesi

, John Duggan
:
Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players. 30-40 - Mario Bravo

, Panayotis Mertikopoulos
:
On the robustness of learning in games with stochastically perturbed payoff observations. 41-66 - Kalyan Chatterjee, Manipushpak Mitra

, Conan Mukherjee
:
Bidding rings: A bargaining approach. 67-82 - Alan Deckelbaum, Silvio Micali:

Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies. 83-93 - Tingting Ding

, Andrew Schotter:
Matching and chatting: An experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms. 94-115 - Mikhail Drugov

, Dmitry Ryvkin
:
Biased contests for symmetric players. 116-144 - Piero Gottardi, Jean-Marc Tallon

, Paolo Ghirardato
:
Flexible contracts. 145-167 - Luisa Herbst, Kai A. Konrad, Florian Morath:

Balance of power and the propensity of conflict. 168-184 - P. Jean-Jacques Herings

, Andrey Meshalkin, Arkadi Predtetchinski
:
A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games. 185-198 - Arnd Heinrich Klein, Armin Schmutzler

:
Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments. 199-224 - Yunan Li

:
Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values. 225-253 - Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters:

Choosing k from m: Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered. 254-261 - Cemil Selcuk

:
Auctions vs. fixed pricing: Competing for budget constrained buyers. 262-285 - Bassel Tarbush, Alexander Teytelboym:

Social groups and social network formation. 286-312

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