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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 108
Volume 108, March 2018
- David K. Levine:
Introduction to the special issue in honor of Lloyd Shapley: Eight topics in game theory. 1-12 - Roberto Serrano:
An annotated bibliography of Lloyd Shapley's contributions. 13-21 - Ziv Hellman, Ron Peretz
:
Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions. 22-36 - André Casajus, Frank Huettner:
Decomposition of solutions and the Shapley value. 37-48 - Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein:
Values for environments with externalities - The average approach. 49-64 - Oskar Skibski, Tomasz P. Michalak, Michael J. Wooldridge:
The Stochastic Shapley Value for coalitional games with externalities. 65-80 - Ben McQuillin, Robert Sugden:
Balanced externalities and the Shapley value. 81-92 - Sylvain Béal, Sylvain Ferrières, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal:
The proportional Shapley value and applications. 93-112 - Koji Yokote, Takumi Kongo, Yukihiko Funaki:
The balanced contributions property for equal contributors. 113-124 - Geoffroy de Clippel:
Membership separability: A new axiomatization of the Shapley value. 125-129 - Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
Is Shapley cost sharing optimal? 130-138 - Elon Kohlberg, Abraham Neyman:
Games of threats. 139-145 - Jean Derks:
The Shapley value of conjunctive-restricted games. 146-151 - Sascha Kurz, Nicola Maaser, Stefan Napel:
Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule. 152-161 - Dongshuang Hou, Hao Sun, Panfei Sun, Theo Driessen:
A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game. 162-169 - Luke Lindsay:
Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges. 170-181 - René van den Brink, Simin He, Jia-Ping Huang:
Polluted river problems and games with a permission structure. 182-205 - Roland Pongou, Jean-Baptiste Tondji:
Valuing inputs under supply uncertainty: The Bayesian Shapley value. 206-224 - Christian Trudeau:
From the bankruptcy problem and its Concede-and-Divide solution to the assignment problem and its Fair Division solution. 225-238 - Leonardo Boncinelli, Paolo Pin:
The stochastic stability of decentralized matching on a graph. 239-244 - Péter Biró, Walter Kern, Daniël Paulusma, Péter Wojuteczky:
The stable fixtures problem with payments. 245-268 - Umut Mert Dur, Thayer Morrill:
Competitive equilibria in school assignment. 269-274 - Ravi Jagadeesan:
Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets. 275-286 - Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers, Ross Rheingans-Yoo:
Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility. 287-294 - Wei-Cheng Chen, Yi-Yi Chen, Yi-Cheng Kao:
Limited choice in college admissions: An experimental study. 295-316 - Alex Rees-Jones:
Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: Evidence from the residency match. 317-330 - Nikolai S. Kukushkin:
A universal construction generating potential games. 331-340 - Man-Wah Cheung, Ratul Lahkar:
Nonatomic potential games: the continuous strategy case. 341-362 - Dominik Karos, Hans Peters:
Effectivity and power. 363-378 - Jane Friedman, Cameron Parker:
The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games. 379-390 - Ori Haimanko:
The axiom of equivalence to individual power and the Banzhaf index. 391-400 - Sergiu Hart, Noam Nisan:
The query complexity of correlated equilibria. 401-410 - János Flesch, Rida Laraki, Vianney Perchet:
Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games. 411-431 - Pradeep Dubey, Siddhartha Sahi, Martin Shubik:
Money as minimal complexity. 432-451 - Pradeep Dubey, Siddhartha Sahi, Martin Shubik:
Graphical exchange mechanisms. 452-465 - Zhigang Cao, Chengzhong Qin, Xiaoguang Yang:
Shapley's conjecture on the cores of abstract market games. 466-477 - Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal, Ludovic A. Julien, Simone Tonin:
Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected set of commodities. 478-485 - Bruno Ziliotto:
Tauberian theorems for general iterations of operators: Applications to zero-sum stochastic games. 486-503 - Fabien Gensbittel, Stefano Lovo, Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala:
Zero-sum revision games. 504-522 - Eilon Solan:
Acceptable strategy profiles in stochastic games. 523-540 - Michel Grabisch, Peter Sudhölter:
On a class of vertices of the core. 541-557 - Joseph M. Ostroy:
Competitive pricing and the core: With reference to matching. 558-573 - Eduard Talamàs:
Fair stable sets of simple games. 574-584 - Manel Baucells, Dov Samet:
Coalition preferences with individual prospects. 585-591 - Jingang Zhao:
Three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley. 592-599 - Alexander Matros:
Lloyd Shapley and chess with imperfect information. 600-613
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