


default search action
Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 109
Volume 109, May 2018
- Volker Britz

:
Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining. 1-20 - Sandro Ambuehl

, Shengwu Li
:
Belief updating and the demand for information. 21-39 - Brit Grosskopf, Lucas Rentschler

, Rajiv Sarin:
An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner. 40-64 - Adrian Hillenbrand

, Fabian Winter
:
Volunteering under population uncertainty. 65-81 - Cheng-Cheng Hu, Min-Hung Tsay

, Chun-Hsien Yeh:
A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: Axiomatic and strategic perspectives. 82-98
- Rabah Amir

, Igor V. Evstigneev:
A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly. 99-103 - Dmitry Lubensky, Eric Schmidbauer

:
Equilibrium informativeness in veto games. 104-125 - Henrique de Oliveira:

Blackwell's informativeness theorem using diagrams. 126-131 - Andreas Blume:

Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games. 132-155 - Christian Basteck, Marco Mantovani:

Cognitive ability and games of school choice. 156-183 - Sayantan Ghosal

, Simone Tonin
:
Noncooperative oligopoly in economies with infinitely many commodities and traders. 184-200 - Qingyun Wu

, Alvin E. Roth
:
The lattice of envy-free matchings. 201-211 - Toshiji Kawagoe, Taisuke Matsubae, Hirokazu Takizawa:

The Skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: Theory and experiment. 212-239 - Debasis Mishra, Swaprava Nath

, Souvik Roy:
Separability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers. 240-261 - Gilat Levy

, Ronny Razin
:
Information diffusion in networks with the Bayesian Peer Influence heuristic. 262-270 - Dean P. Foster, Sergiu Hart

:
Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics. 271-293 - Subhasish Dugar, Quazi Shahriar:

Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination. 294-310 - Brice Corgnet

, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Roberto Hernán González:
Goal setting in the principal-agent model: Weak incentives for strong performance. 311-326 - Yu Zhou, Shigehiro Serizawa:

Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule. 327-363 - Drew Fudenberg, Yuichiro Kamada:

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs. 364-381 - Benjamin Sperisen

:
Bounded memory and incomplete information. 382-400 - Zifan Li, Ambuj Tewari

:
Sampled fictitious play is Hannan consistent. 401-412 - Shurojit Chatterji

, Huaxia Zeng:
On random social choice functions with the tops-only property. 413-435 - A. Yesim Orhun

:
Perceived motives and reciprocity. 436-451 - Vernon L. Smith, Bart J. Wilson

:
Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted. 452-464 - Jon X. Eguia

, Aniol Llorente-Saguer
, Rebecca B. Morton, Antonio Nicolò
:
Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information. 465-483 - Bogaçhan Çelen, Onur Özgür:

Final-offer arbitration with uncertainty averse parties. 484-500 - Ilwoo Hwang

:
A theory of bargaining deadlock. 501-522 - Ziv Hellman

, Amnon Schreiber:
Indexing gamble desirability by extending proportional stochastic dominance. 523-543 - Eva I. Hoppe, Patrick W. Schmitz

:
Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory. 544-564 - Shachar Kariv

, Maciej H. Kotowski, C. Matthew Leister:
Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks. 565-581 - Simon Grant

, J. Jude Kline, John Quiggin
:
Contracting under uncertainty: A principal-agent model with ambiguity averse parties. 582-597 - Spyros Galanis

:
Speculation under unawareness. 598-615 - Nabil I. Al-Najjar

, Eran Shmaya:
Learning the fundamentals in a stationary environment. 616-624 - Claudia M. Landeo, Maxim Nikitin:

Financially-constrained lawyers: An economic theory of legal disputes. 625-647

manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.


Google
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Internet Archive Scholar
CiteSeerX
ORCID














