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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 110
Volume 110, July 2018
- Haris Aziz

, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Markus Brill:
On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness. 1-18 - Laurent Mathevet:

An axiomatization of plays in repeated games. 19-31 - José Alcalde

:
Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (Hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching. 32-49 - Ennio Bilancini

, Leonardo Boncinelli
:
Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information. 50-57
- Mikhail B. Iskakov, Alexey B. Iskakov

, Claude d'Aspremont:
Games for cautious players: The Equilibrium in Secure Strategies. 58-70 - Mustafa Oguz Afacan

:
The object allocation problem with random priorities. 71-89 - Jan-Henrik Steg

:
Preemptive investment under uncertainty. 90-119 - Andrés Perea:

Why forward induction leads to the backward induction outcome: A new proof for Battigalli's theorem. 120-138 - Xi Chen, Ilias Diakonikolas, Dimitris Paparas, Xiaorui Sun, Mihalis Yannakakis:

The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer. 139-164 - Alessandro Ispano:

Information acquisition and the value of bad news. 165-173 - Ahuva Mu'alem, Michael Schapira:

Setting lower bounds on truthfulness. 174-193 - Lukas M. Wenner:

Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment. 194-215 - John Rehbeck

:
Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games. 216-225 - Philip Ushchev

, Yves Zenou
:
Price competition in product variety networks. 226-247 - Dieter Balkenborg

:
Rationalizability and logical inference. 248-257 - Derek J. Clark, Tore Nilssen:

Keep on fighting: The dynamics of head starts in all-pay auctions. 258-272 - Sung-Ha Hwang, Wooyoung Lim, Philip R. Neary, Jonathan Newton

:
Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry. 273-294 - Yan Chen

, Ming Jiang
, Onur Kesten, Stéphane Robin, Min Zhu:
Matching in the large: An experimental study. 295-317 - Ned Augenblick, Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed:

To reveal or not to reveal: Privacy preferences and economic frictions. 318-329 - Chiara Margaria, Alex Smolin:

Dynamic communication with biased senders. 330-339

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