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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 131
Volume 131, January 2022
- Salvador Barberà

, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno:
Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models. 1-28 - Olena Orlova:

Idiosyncratic preferences in games on networks. 29-50
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer

:
The Trembling Chairman Paradox. 51-56
- Mark Satterthwaite, Steven R. Williams, Konstantinos E. Zachariadis:

Price discovery using a double auction. 57-83 - Dawen Meng, Lei Sun, Guoqiang Tian:

Dynamic mechanism design on social networks. 84-120 - Hande Erkut:

Social norms and preferences for generosity are domain dependent. 121-140 - Jordan Chellig

, Calina Durbac
, Nikolaos Fountoulakis:
Best response dynamics on random graphs. 141-170 - George Georgiadis

, Youngsoo Kim
, H. Dharma Kwon:
The absence of attrition in a war of attrition under complete information. 171-185
- Moran Koren

, Manuel Mueller-Frank
:
The welfare costs of informationally efficient prices. 186-196
- Vittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Michele Flammini

, Ayumi Igarashi
, Gianpiero Monaco
, Dominik Peters
, Cosimo Vinci
, William S. Zwicker
:
Almost envy-free allocations with connected bundles. 197-221 - Wonki Jo Cho

:
How to add apples and oranges: Aggregating performances of different nature. 222-244 - Andreas Grunewald

, Matthias Kräkel
:
Information manipulation and competition. 245-263
- Anna Jaskiewicz

, Andrzej S. Nowak
:
A note on topological aspects in dynamic games of resource extraction and economic growth theory. 264-274 - Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro

, Gabriel Y. Weintraub:
Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing. 275-291

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