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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 132
Volume 132, March 2022
- Marco Pangallo
, James B. T. Sanders, Tobias Galla, J. Doyne Farmer:
Towards a taxonomy of learning dynamics in 2 × 2 games. 1-21 - Luciano Irineu de Castro, Antonio F. Galvao, Charles N. Noussair, Liang Qiao:
Do people maximize quantiles? 22-40 - Ahrash Dianat, Federico Echenique, Leeat Yariv:
Statistical discrimination and affirmative action in the lab. 41-58 - Cristina Bicchieri, Eugen Dimant, Simon Gächter, Daniele Nosenzo:
Social proximity and the erosion of norm compliance. 59-72 - Patrick Harless, William Phan:
Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects. 73-89 - Kyle Hyndman, Matthew J. Walker:
Fairness and risk in ultimatum bargaining. 90-105 - Ayça Kaya, Santanu Roy:
Market screening with limited records. 106-132 - Raouf Boucekkine, Giorgio Fabbri, Salvatore Federico, Fausto Gozzi:
A dynamic theory of spatial externalities. 133-165 - Jeevant Rampal:
Limited Foresight Equilibrium. 166-188 - Benjamin V. Rosa:
Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions. 189-203 - Kfir Eliaz, Ran Spiegler:
On incentive-compatible estimators. 204-220 - Emilien Macault, Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala:
Social learning in nonatomic routing games. 221-233
- René Kirkegaard:
Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices. 234-239
- Yaron Azrieli:
Delegated expertise: Implementability with peer-monitoring. 240-254 - Noelia Juárez, Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo:
Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets. 255-273 - Hideo Konishi, Chen-Yu Pan, Dimitar Simeonov:
Equilibrium player choices in team contests with multiple pairwise battles. 274-287 - Maxim Ivanov, Alex Sam:
Cheap talk with private signal structures. 288-304
- Bin Wu:
On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games. 305-315
- Markus Kinateder, Luca Paolo Merlino:
Local public goods with weighted link formation. 316-327 - Elena D'Agostino, Daniel J. Seidmann:
The order of presentation in trials: Plaintive plaintiffs. 328-336
- Jingfeng Lu, Yuanzhu Lu, Zhewei Wang, Lixue Zhou:
Winner-leave versus loser-leave in multi-stage nested Tullock contests. 337-352
- Marina Núñez, Juan J. Vidal-Puga:
Stable cores in information graph games. 353-367
- Yusuke Iwase, Shoya Tsuruta, Akina Yoshimura:
Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities. 368-379 - Tomoya Tajika:
Voting on tricky questions. 380-389
- Dov Samet:
The impossibility of agreeing to disagree: An extension of the sure-thing principle. 390-399 - Mustafa Oguz Afacan:
College admissions with tuition transfers. 400-420 - Jie Shuai, Huanxing Yang, Lan Zhang:
Dominant firm and competitive bundling in oligopoly markets. 421-447 - Blake A. Allison, Adib Bagh, Jason J. Lepore:
Invariant equilibria and classes of equivalent games. 448-462 - Armando Gomes:
Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation. 463-477 - Vijay V. Vazirani:
The general graph matching game: Approximate core. 478-486 - Simon Grant, Ronald Stauber:
Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium. 487-509 - Brishti Guha, Prabal Roy Chowdhury:
Affirmative action in the presence of income heterogeneity. 510-533 - Swagata Bhattacharjee:
Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity. 534-552 - Huiyi Guo, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
Robust coalitional implementation. 553-575 - Shiri Alon, Gilad Bavly, Gabrielle Gayer:
Inductive inference with incompleteness. 576-591
- Gabriel Ziegler:
Informational robustness of common belief in rationality. 592-597
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