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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 134
Volume 134, July 2022
- Francesc Dilmé:
Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest. 1-19 - Pol Campos-Mercade:
When are groups less moral than individuals? 20-36 - Zhiwei Cui, Fei Shi:
Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation. 37-51 - Inga Deimen, Julia Wirtz:
Control, cost, and confidence: Perseverance and procrastination in the face of failure. 52-74 - Edoardo Gallo, Yohanes E. Riyanto, Nilanjan Roy, Tat-How Teh:
Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks. 75-103 - Shuchi Chawla, Yifeng Teng, Christos Tzamos:
Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing. 104-116 - Sophie Bade:
Dynamic semi-consistency. 117-126 - Yiyin Cao, Chuangyin Dang:
A variant of Harsanyi's tracing procedures to select a perfect equilibrium in normal form games. 127-150 - Marc P. Saur, Markus G. Schlatterer, Stefanie Y. Schmitt:
Limited perception and price discrimination in a model of horizontal product differentiation. 151-168 - Ai Takeuchi, Róbert F. Veszteg, Yoshio Kamijo, Yukihiko Funaki:
Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes. 169-198 - Niklas Hahn, Martin Hoefer, Rann Smorodinsky:
The secretary recommendation problem. 199-228 - Saori Chiba, Kazumi Hori:
Two-sided strategic information transmission. 229-241 - Stéphan Sémirat, Françoise Forges:
Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case. 242-263 - Spencer Bastani, Thomas Giebe, Oliver Gürtler:
Simple equilibria in general contests. 264-280
- Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Noam Nisan:
The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation. 281-307 - Constantinos Daskalakis, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Learning in auctions: Regret is hard, envy is easy. 308-343 - Shuchi Chawla, Nikhil R. Devanur, Anna R. Karlin, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Simple pricing schemes for consumers with evolving values. 344-360 - Krishnamurthy Dvijotham, Yuval Rabani, Leonard J. Schulman:
Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets. 361-375 - Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein:
Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria. 376-398 - Christos H. Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos, Alexandros Psomas, Aviad Rubinstein:
On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design. 399-427 - Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim:
Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding. 428-448
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