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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 33
Volume 33, Number 1, October 2000
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Ana B. Ania, Klaus Reiner Schenk-Hoppé:
An Evolutionary Model of Bertrand Oligopoly. 1-19 - Angelo Artale, Hans Peter Grüner:
A Model of Stability and Persistence in a Democracy. 20-40 - Christian Ewerhart:
Chess-like Games Are Dominance Solvable in at Most Two Steps. 41-47 - Maria-Ángeles de Frutos:
Asymmetric Price-Benefits Auctions. 48-71 - Akihiko Matsui, Andrew Postlewaite:
Specialization of Labor and the Distribution of Income. 72-89 - Axel Ockenfels, Reinhard Selten:
An Experiment on the Hypothesis of Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining. 90-116 - Régis Renault:
Privately Observed Time Horizons in Repeated Games. 117-125 - Yves Sprumont:
Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules. 126-144 - Karl Wärneryd:
In Defense of Lawyers: Moral Hazard as an Aid to Cooperation. 145-158
Volume 33, Number 2, November 2000
- Sandeep Baliga, Robert Evans:
Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Side-Payments. 159-176 - Gary Charness:
Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test Of Aumann's Conjecture. 177-194 - Yeon-Koo Che:
Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A Comment on De Fraja (1999). 195-205 - Kim-Sau Chung:
On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings. 206-230 - Philip A. Haile:
Partial Pooling at the Reserve Price in Auctions with Resale Opportunities. 231-248 - Efe A. Ok, Lin Zhou:
The Choquet Bargaining Solutions. 249-264 - Motty Perry, Elmar Wolfstetter, Shmuel Zamir:
A Sealed-Bid Auction That Matches the English Auction. 265-273 - Yosef Rinott, Marco Scarsini:
On the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Random Games. 274-293 - Guoqiang Tian:
Incentive Mechanism Design for Production Economies with Both Private and Public Ownerships. 294-320
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