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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 35
Volume 35, Numbers 1-2, April 2001
- Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz, Hal R. Varian:

Economics and Artificial Intelligence. 1-5 - Ken Binmore, Larry Samuelson:

Coordinated Action in the Electronic Mail Game. 6-30 - Aviad Heifetz, Philippe Mongin:

Probability Logic for Type Spaces. 31-53 - Daniel Lehmann:

Expected Qualitative Utility Maximization. 54-79 - Amy Greenwald

, Eric J. Friedman, Scott Shenker:
Learning in Network Contexts: Experimental Results from Simulations. 80-123 - David C. Parkes, Bernardo A. Huberman:

Multiagent Cooperative Search for Portfolio Selection. 124-165 - Noam Nisan, Amir Ronen:

Algorithmic Mechanism Design. 166-196 - Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:

On Rational Computability and Communication Complexity. 197-211 - Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser:

Leveled Commitment Contracts and Strategic Breach. 212-270 - Michael P. Wellman

, William E. Walsh, Peter R. Wurman
, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason
:
Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling. 271-303 - Peter R. Wurman

, Michael P. Wellman
, William E. Walsh:
A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space. 304-338 - Nir Vulkan:

Equilibria in Automated Interactions. 339-348

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