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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 42
Volume 42, Number 1, January 2003
- Pradeep Dubey, Ori Haimanko
:
Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments. 1-24 - Olivier Gossner, Nicolas Vieille:
Strategic learning in games with symmetric information. 25-47 - Paul Heidhues, Johan Lagerlöf:
Hiding information in electoral competition. 48-74 - Drora Karotkin, Mary Schaps:
The network of weighted majority rules and its geometric realizations. 75-90 - Flip Klijn, Jordi Massó:
Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model. 91-100 - Ehud Lehrer:
A wide range no-regret theorem. 101-115 - Antonio Merlo, Andrew Schotter:
Learning by not doing: an experimental investigation of observational learning. 116-136 - Massimo Morelli, Maria Montero:
The demand bargaining set: general characterization and application to majority games. 137-155 - Jeroen Suijs:
Cost allocation in spanning network enterprises with stochastic connection costs. 156-171 - Hans K. Hvide, Eirik G. Kristiansen:
Risk taking in selection contests. 172-179
Volume 42, Number 2, February 2003
- Rabah Amir, Igor V. Evstigneev, John Wooders:
Noncooperative versus cooperative R&D with endogenous spillover rates. 183-207 - Geir B. Asheim, Martin Dufwenberg:
Admissibility and common belief. 208-234 - Vincent Buskens:
Trust in triads: effects of exit, control, and learning. 235-252 - Alok Kumar, Martin Shubik:
A computational analysis of core convergence in a multiple equilibria economy. 253-266 - Kali P. Rath, Gongyun Zhao:
Nonminimal product differentiation as a bargaining outcome. 267-280 - David Schmidt, Robert Shupp, James M. Walker, Elinor Ostrom:
Playing safe in coordination games: : the roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play. 281-299 - Eran Shmaya, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille:
An application of Ramsey theorem to stopping games. 300-306 - Federico Echenique, Tarun Sabarwal:
Strong comparative statics of equilibria. 307-314 - Wojciech Olszewski:
A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem. 315-318 - Asher Wolinsky:
Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain. 319-326 - Philip J. Reny:
The Collected Papers of Robert J. Aumann: Robert J. Aumann, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000. Volume 1, 720 pp; Volume 2, 672 pp. 327-332
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