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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 46
Volume 46, Number 1, January 2004
- Abhijit Banerjee, Drew Fudenberg:
Word-of-mouth learning. 1-22 - Anthony Burton, Martin Sefton
:
Risk, pre-play communication and equilibrium. 23-40 - Francesco De Sinopoli:
A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy. 41-54 - Amrita Dhillon
, Ben Lockwood:
When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable? 55-75 - Özgür Kibris:
Ordinal invariance in multicoalitional bargaining. 76-87 - Wojciech Olszewski:
Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods. 88-114 - Christopher Phelan:
On the irrelevance of the maturity structure of government debt without commitment. 115-128 - Zvi Safra, Dov Samet:
An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players. 129-142 - Amparo Urbano
, José Enrique Vila:
Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. 143-173 - Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai
, Shigeo Matsubara:
The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions. 174-188 - Yoram Halevy
:
The possibility of speculative trade between dynamically consistent agents. 189-198 - Marilda Sotomayor:
Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. 199-212 - Itzhak Gilboa:
Honor, Symbols, and War: By Barry O'Neill, University of Michigan Press, 1999. 213-214 - Barry O'Neill:
Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 3: Edited by Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart, Elsevier, New York, 2002. 215-218 - Sanjeev Goyal, Sumit Joshi:
Erratum to "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly": [Games Econ. Behavior 43 (1) (2003) 57-85]. 219
Volume 46, Number 2, February 2004
- Olivier Armantier:
Does observation influence learning? 221-239 - Andreas Blume, Tone Arnold:
Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games. 240-259 - James C. Cox:
How to identify trust and reciprocity. 260-281 - Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine:
Learning to play Bayesian games. 282-303 - Pradeep Dubey, Ori Haimanko
:
Learning with perfect information. 304-324 - Federico Echenique:
A characterization of strategic complementarities. 325-347 - Federico Echenique:
Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities. 348-364 - Jacob K. Goeree
, Charles A. Holt:
A model of noisy introspection. 365-382 - Jinwoo Kim, Yeon-Koo Che:
Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions. 383-397 - Val E. Lambson, Daniel Probst:
Learning by matching patterns. 398-409 - Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg:
The averaging mechanism. 410-424 - Alfredo Di Tillio:
A note on one-shot public mediated talk. 425-433
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