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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 49
Volume 49, Number 1, October 2004
- Coralio Ballester
:
NP-completeness in hedonic games. 1-30 - Rana Barua, Satya R. Chakravarty
, Sonali Roy, Palash Sarkar:
A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index. 31-48 - Oliver Board:
Dynamic interactive epistemology. 49-80 - Timothy N. Cason, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Takehiko Yamato
, Konomu Yokotani:
Non-excludable public good experiments. 81-102 - Lars Ehlers, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken:
Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems. 103-116 - Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev
:
The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining. 117-134 - P. Jean-Jacques Herings
, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch:
Rationalizability for social environments. 135-156 - Özgür Kibris:
Egalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule. 157-170 - Mark Stegeman, Paul Rhode:
Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations. 171-214 - Benny Moldovanu:
Paul Milgrom, , Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004) Cambridge Univ. Press. 215-219
Volume 49, Number 2, November 2004
- M. Josune Albizuri, José Manuel Zarzuelo
:
On coalitional semivalues. 221-243 - Jens Josephson
, Alexander Matros:
Stochastic imitation in finite games. 244-259 - Stephen Morris, Takashi Ui:
Best response equivalence. 260-287 - Abhinay Muthoo:
A model of the origins of basic property rights. 288-312 - Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala:
Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. 313-344 - Harborne W. Stuart Jr.:
Efficient spatial competition. 345-362 - Moshe Tennenholtz:
Program equilibrium. 363-373 - Felix Várdy:
The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs. 374-400 - John Morgan, Felix Várdy:
An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs. 401-423 - Pablo Amorós
:
Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation. 424-434
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