default search action
Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 50
Volume 50, Number 1, January 2005
- Edi Karni, Andrew Postlewaite:
David Schmeidler. 1-2 - Werner Hildenbrand, Alois Kneip:
Aggregate behavior and microdata. 3-27 - Edi Karni:
Subjective expected utility theory with costly actions. 28-41 - Ehud Lehrer:
Updating non-additive probabilities - a geometric approach. 42-57 - Richard P. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite:
Core convergence with asymmetric information. 58-78 - Ram Orzach, Yair Tauman:
Strategic dropouts. 79-88 - Dov Samet, Zvi Safra:
A family of ordinal solutions to bargaining problems with many players. 89-106 - Peter P. Wakker:
Decision-foundations for properties of nonadditive measures: general state spaces or general outcome spaces. 107-125 - Peyton Young:
Proposals to host the Third World Congress of the Game Theory Society. 127
Volume 50, Number 2, February 2005
- Youngsub Chun, William Thomson:
Convergence under replication of rules to adjudicate conflicting claims. 129-142 - Geoffroy de Clippel, Enrico Minelli:
Two remarks on the inner core. 143-154 - Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson:
Sunk costs and fairness in incomplete information bargaining. 155-177 - Sanjeev Goyal, Fernando Vega-Redondo:
Network formation and social coordination. 178-207 - Christopher J. Harris, Maxwell B. Stinchcombe, William R. Zame:
Nearly compact and continuous normal form games: characterizations and equilibrium existence. 208-224 - Biung-Ghi Ju:
Strategy-proof risk sharing. 225-254 - Michael Mandler:
Incomplete preferences and rational intransitivity of choice. 255-277 - Akira Okada, Arno Riedl:
Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game: experimental evidence. 278-311 - Roberto Serrano, Rajiv Vohra:
A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation. 312-331 - Maxwell B. Stinchcombe:
Nash equilibrium and generalized integration for infinite normal form games. 332-365
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.