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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 68
Volume 68, Number 1, January 2010
- Steve Alpern, Shmuel Gal, Eilon Solan
:
A sequential selection game with vetoes. 1-14 - Eyal Beigman:
Simple games with many effective voters. 15-22 - Chris Bidner:
Pre-match investment with frictions. 23-34 - Olivier Bochet, Toyotaka Sakai:
Secure implementation in allotment economies. 35-49 - Marco E. Castillo, Ragan Petrie:
Discrimination in the lab: Does information trump appearance? 50-59 - Damian S. Damianov, Jörg Oechssler, Johannes Gerd Becker:
Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply - experimental evidence. 60-76 - Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Diego Moreno, Benyamin Shitovitz:
On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium. 77-94 - Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson, Sigve Tjøtta, Gaute Torsvik:
Testing guilt aversion. 95-107 - Amanda Friedenberg:
When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs? 108-129 - Gabrielle Gayer:
Perception of probabilities in situations of risk: A case based approach. 130-143 - Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu:
Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information. 144-154 - Joseph Y. Halpern:
Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability. 155-179 - Florian Herold:
Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust. 180-191 - Maarten C. W. Janssen, Santanu Roy:
Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly. 192-207 - Olof Johansson-Stenman:
Risk aversion and expected utility of consumption over time. 208-219 - Çagatay Kayi, Eve Ramaekers:
Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems. 220-232 - Özgür Kibris, Ipek Gürsel Tapki:
Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Monotonic rules. 233-241 - Chongmin Kim, Kam-Chau Wong:
Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies. 242-254 - Sebastian Kranz:
Moral norms in a partly compliant society. 255-274 - François Maniquet, Yves Sprumont:
Sharing the cost of a public good: An incentive-constrained axiomatic approach. 275-302 - Michal Ramsza, Robert M. Seymour:
Fictitious play in an evolutionary environment. 303-324 - Julian Rode:
Truth and trust in communication: Experiments on the effect of a competitive context. 325-338 - Alexander Sebald:
Attribution and reciprocity. 339-352 - Curtis R. Taylor, Hüseyin Yildirim:
Public information and electoral bias. 353-375
- Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenaël Piaser, Uday Rajan:
On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard. 376-380 - Guilherme Carmona:
Polytopes and the existence of approximate equilibria in discontinuous games. 381-388 - Yi-Chun Chen:
Universality of the Epstein-Wang type structure. 389-402 - Mark Voorneveld:
The possibility of impossible stairways: Tail events and countable player sets. 403-410
- Moshe Dror, Greys Sosic:
Behavioral & Quantitative Game Theory Conference on Future Directions May 14-16, 2010, Fairmont Hotel, Newport Beach, CA. 411
Volume 68, Number 2, March 2010
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Nick Netzer:
The logit-response dynamics. 413-427 - Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson, Zaifu Yang:
Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages. 428-442 - Joyce E. Berg, John Dickhaut, Thomas A. Rietz:
Preference reversals: The impact of truth-revealing monetary incentives. 443-468 - Carmen Beviá, Luis C. Corchón:
Peace agreements without commitment. 469-487 - Andreas Blume, Uri Gneezy:
Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: An experimental study. 488-511 - Endre Boros, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Vladimir Gurvich, Kazuhisa Makino:
On effectivity functions of game forms. 512-531 - Markus Brunnermeier, John Morgan:
Clock games: Theory and experiments. 532-550 - Gary Charness, Edi Karni, Dan Levin:
On the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment: New experimental evidence regarding Linda. 551-556 - Yan Chen, Kan Takeuchi:
Multi-object auctions with package bidding: An experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA. 557-579 - Gabrielle Demange:
Sharing information in Web communities. 580-601 - Ronen Gradwohl, Omer Reingold:
Partial exposure in large games. 602-613 - Emily C. Haisley, Roberto A. Weber:
Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior. 614-625 - P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Gerard van der Laan, A. J. J. Talman, Zaifu Yang:
The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure. 626-633 - Andreas Lange, Anmol Ratan:
Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions - How (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field. 634-645 - Gea M. Lee:
Optimal collusion with internal contracting. 646-669 - Ehud Lehrer, Dinah Rosenberg, Eran Shmaya:
Signaling and mediation in games with common interests. 670-682 - Andrew McLennan, Rabee Tourky:
Simple complexity from imitation games. 683-688 - Nikos Nikiforakis:
Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good experiments. 689-702 - Sérgio O. Parreiras, Anna Rubinchik:
Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents. 703-715 - Scott Rick, Roberto A. Weber:
Meaningful learning and transfer of learning in games played repeatedly without feedback. 716-730 - Roman M. Sheremeta:
Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests. 731-747 - Artyom Shneyerov, Adam Chi Leung Wong:
Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information. 748-762
- Juan Carlos Carbajal:
On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle. 763-772 - Scott Duke Kominers:
Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching. 773-780 - Imran Rasul, Silvia Sonderegger:
The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships. 781-788
- Aviad Heifetz:
Games and science. 789-792
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