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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 71
Volume 71, Number 1, January 2011
- Avinash Dixit, Ehud Kalai, Stephen Morris:

Editorial: A special issue dedicated to John Nash. 1 - Ken Binmore:

Commentary: Nash's work in economics. 2-5 - Sergiu Hart

:
Commentary: Nash equilibrium and dynamics. 6-8 - Eric Maskin:

Commentary: Nash equilibrium and mechanism design. 9-11 - H. Peyton Young:

Commentary: John Nash and evolutionary game theory. 12-13
- Nejat Anbarci

, John H. Boyd III:
Nash demand game and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. 14-22 - Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau:

On the existence of pure-strategy perfect equilibrium in discontinuous games. 23-48 - Eva Cárceles-Poveda, Yair Tauman:

A strategic analysis of the war against transnational terrorism. 49-65 - Juan D. Carrillo, Thomas R. Palfrey:

No trade. 66-87 - Kfir Eliaz, Ariel Rubinstein:

Edgar Allan Poe's riddle: Framing effects in repeated matching pennies games. 88-99 - Drew Fudenberg, Satoru Takahashi:

Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play. 100-120 - Sergei Izmalkov, Matt Lepinski, Silvio Micali:

Perfect implementation. 121-140 - Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin Leyton-Brown

, Navin A. R. Bhat:
Action-Graph Games. 141-173 - George J. Mailath, Wojciech Olszewski:

Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring. 174-192 - Samuel Rota Bulò

, Immanuel M. Bomze
:
Infection and immunization: A new class of evolutionary game dynamics. 193-211 - Armin Schmutzler

:
A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments. 212-223 - Gábor Virág:

High profit equilibria in directed search models. 224-234
Volume 71, Number 2, March 2011
- Elie Appelbaum:

Union-firm bargaining: Order of play and efficiency. 235-245 - Sophie Bade:

Ambiguous act equilibria. 246-260 - Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris:

Robust implementation in general mechanisms. 261-281 - Alessandra Cassar, Mary L. Rigdon:

Trust and trustworthiness in networked exchange. 282-303 - Chih Chang, Ying-Chih Tseng:

On the coincidence property. 304-314 - Steve Chien, Alistair Sinclair:

Convergence to approximate Nash equilibria in congestion games. 315-327 - Robin P. Cubitt, Robert Sugden

:
The reasoning-based expected utility procedure. 328-338 - Ángel Hernando-Veciana

, Michael Tröge:
The insider's curse. 339-350 - Steffen Huck

, Philippe Jehiel, Tom Rutter:
Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment. 351-365 - Asen Ivanov:

Attitudes to ambiguity in one-shot normal-form games: An experimental study. 366-394 - Maria Montero

, Juan J. Vidal-Puga
:
Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games. 395-408 - Itai Sher:

Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion. 409-419 - Marco Slikker, Henk Norde:

The monoclus of a coalitional game. 420-435 - Noah D. Stein, Pablo A. Parrilo

, Asuman E. Ozdaglar:
Correlated equilibria in continuous games: Characterization and computation. 436-455 - Kan Takeuchi:

Non-parametric test of time consistency: Present bias and future bias. 456-478 - Pingzhong Tang, Fangzhen Lin:

Two equivalence results for two-person strict games. 479-486 - Mark Walker, John Wooders

, Rabah Amir:
Equilibrium play in matches: Binary Markov games. 487-502
- Ran Eilat, Ady Pauzner

:
Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects. 503-512 - Yusuke Kamishiro:

Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies. 513-520 - Yoav Kerner:

Equilibrium joining probabilities for an M/G/1 queue. 521-526 - Ludovic Renou

, Karl H. Schlag
:
Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium. 527-533
- Mark Voorneveld

:
Julio González-Díaz, Ignacio García-Jurado, M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, , An Introductory Course on Mathematical Game Theory Graduate Studies in Mathematics volume 115 (2010) American Mathematical Society 978-0-8218-5151-7 xiii+324 pages. 534-538

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