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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 79
Volume 79, May 2013
- Esteban Arcaute, Kirill Dyagilev, Ramesh Johari, Shie Mannor:
Dynamics in tree formation games. 1-29 - Marcin Dziubinski, Sanjeev Goyal:
Network design and defence. 30-43 - Stefan T. Trautmann, Richard J. Zeckhauser:
Shunning uncertainty: The neglect of learning opportunities. 44-55 - Penélope Hernández, Manuel Muñoz-Herrera, Ángel Sánchez:
Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences. 56-66
- Luciano Andreozzi:
Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata. 67-74
- Ian M. McDonald, Nikos Nikiforakis, Nilss Olekalns, Hugh Sibly:
Social comparisons and reference group formation: Some experimental evidence. 75-89
- Yoshihiro Ohashi:
Erratum to "Note: Two-person ex post implementation" [Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 435-440]. 90-91
- Xiaoshu Xu, Dan Levin, Lixin Ye:
Auctions with entry and resale. 92-105
- Enghin Atalay:
Sources of variation in social networks. 106-131 - Jeanine Miklós-Thal, Heiner Schumacher:
The value of recommendations. 132-147 - Javier Rivas:
Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching. 148-162 - Valerio Capraro, Marco Scarsini:
Existence of equilibria in countable games: An algebraic approach. 163-180 - Andrew McGee, Huanxing Yang:
Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information. 181-191 - Dov Samet:
Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information. 192-200 - Salvatore Piccolo, Marco Pagnozzi:
Information sharing between vertical hierarchies. 201-222 - C. Nicholas McKinney Jr., John B. Van Huyck:
Eureka Learning: Heuristics and response time in perfect information games. 223-232
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