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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 83
Volume 83, January 2014
- Holger Herz

, Daniel Schunk, Christian Zehnder
:
How do judgmental overconfidence and overoptimism shape innovative activity? 1-23 - Antonio Cabrales

, Piero Gottardi:
Markets for information: Of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies. 24-44 - Nozomu Muto

:
Strategic complexity in repeated extensive games. 45-52 - Emerson Melo

:
Price competition, free entry, and welfare in congested markets. 53-72 - Takehito Masuda

, Yoshitaka Okano, Tatsuyoshi Saijo:
The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally. 73-85 - Michalis Drouvelis

, Alejandro Saporiti
, Nicolaas J. Vriend:
Political motivations and electoral competition: Equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence. 86-115 - Jörg Franke

, Christian Kanzow, Wolfgang Leininger, Alexandra Schwartz
:
Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: A revenue dominance theorem. 116-126 - Alex Barrachina, Yair Tauman, Amparo Urbano

:
Entry and espionage with noisy signals. 127-146 - Marco Battaglini

, Uliana Makarov:
Cheap talk with multiple audiences: An experimental analysis. 147-164 - Ehud Lehrer, Dov Samet:

Belief consistency and trade consistency. 165-177 - Eugen Kovác, Robert C. Schmidt

:
Market share dynamics in a duopoly model with word-of-mouth communication. 178-206 - Eduardo M. Azevedo

:
Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets. 207-223 - Shiran Rachmilevitch:

First-best collusion without communication. 224-230 - Andrés Perea:

Belief in the opponents' future rationality. 231-254 - Sander Heinsalu

:
Universal type structures with unawareness. 255-266 - Gabrielle Gayer, Itzhak Gilboa:

Analogies and theories: The role of simplicity and the emergence of norms. 267-283 - Navin Kartik, Olivier Tercieux, Richard Holden

:
Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty. 284-290

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