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International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 28
Volume 28, Number 1, February 1999
- Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno

, Benyamin Shitovitz:
The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications. 1-14 - Alexander Vasin:

The Folk theorem for dominance solutions. 15-24 - Jingang Zhao:

The existence of TU α-core in normal form games. 25-34 - Moshe Bar Niv (Burnovski), Israel Zang:

"Costless" regulation of monopolies with large entry cost: A game theoretic approach. 35-52 - P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Vincent Vannetelbosch:

Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games. 53-68 - Klaus Ritzberger:

Recall in extensive form games. 69-87 - Douglas D. Davis, Charles A. Holt:

Equilibrium cooperation in two-stage games: Experimental evidence. 89-109 - Dale O. Stahl:

Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games. 111-130 - John Duffy, Nick Feltovich

:
Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study. 131-152
Volume 28, Number 2, May 1999
- Yukihiko Funaki, Takehiko Yamato

:
The core of an economy with a common pool resource: A partition function form approach. 157-171 - Jean Derks

, Hans Haller:
Weighted nucleoli. 173-187 - Aner Sela, Dorothea Herreiner:

Fictitious play in coordination games. 189-197 - Alvaro Sandroni

, Rann Smorodinsky:
The speed of rational learning. 199-210 - J. R. G. van Gellekom, Jos A. M. Potters, J. H. Reijnierse:

Prosperity properties of TU-games. 211-227 - Tamás Solymosi

:
On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games. 229-240 - Claudia Keser, Roy Gardner:

Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game. 241-252 - Akira Nakayama, Takeshi Naitoh:

On some properties of the ε-core of games with coalition structure. 253-255
Volume 28, Number 3, August 1999
- Barton L. Lipman:

Dedication: In honor of Robert J. Aumann. 261 - Robert J. Aumann:

Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge. 263-300 - Robert J. Aumann:

Interactive epistemology II: Probability. 301-314 - Joseph Y. Halpern:

Hypothetical knowledge and counterfactual reasoning. 315-330 - Ronald Fagin, John Geanakoplos, Joseph Y. Halpern, Moshe Y. Vardi:

The hierarchical approach to modeling knowledge and common knowledge. 331-365 - Robert Samuel Simon:

The difference between common knowledge of formulas and sets. 367-384 - Stephen Morris:

Approximate common knowledge revisited. 385-408 - Giacomo Bonanno, Klaus Nehring:

How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information. 409-434 - Aviad Heifetz:

How canonical is the canonical model? A comment on Aumann's interactive epistemology. 435-442
Volume 28, Number 4, November 1999
- Ilan Eshel, Emilia Sansone, Avner Shaked:

The emergence of kinship behavior in structured populations of unrelated individuals. 447-463 - Frédéric Palomino, Fernando Vega-Redondo:

Convergence of aspirations and (partial) cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma. 465-488 - Katerina Sherstyuk

:
Multisided matching games with complementarities. 489-509 - Youngsub Chun:

Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems. 511-520 - Flip Klijn, Marco Slikker, José Manuel Zarzuelo:

Characterizations of a multi-choice value. 521-532 - Michael A. Jones

:
The effect of punishment duration of trigger strategies and quasifinite continuation probabilities for Prisoners' Dilemmas. 533-546 - Michel Grabisch, Marc Roubens:

An axiomatic approach to the concept of interaction among players in cooperative games. 547-565 - Marilda Sotomayor:

The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game. 567-583 - Kim Allan Andersen, Mikael Lind:

Computing the NTU-Shapley value of NTU-games defined by multiple objective linear programs. 585-597 - Frank Schuhmacher:

Proper rationalizability and backward induction. 599-615

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