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ORCIDInternational Journal of Game Theory, Volume 41
Volume 41, Number 1, February 2012
- Yasuhiro Shirata
:
The evolution of fairness under an assortative matching rule in the ultimatum game. 1-21 - Lisa V. Bruttel, Werner Güth, Ulrich Kamecke:
Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments without a commonly known end. 23-47 - Licun Xue, Lingling Zhang:
Bidding and sequential coalition formation with externalities. 49-73 - Péter Biró, Walter Kern, Daniël Paulusma:
Computing solutions for matching games. 75-90 - Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer:
Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition. 91-129 - Leandro Chaves Rêgo, Joseph Y. Halpern:
Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players. 131-155 - Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal:
Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games. 157-178 - Marilda Sotomayor:
A further note on the college admission game. 179-193 - Abraham Neyman:
The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information and uncertain duration. 195-207 - Antonio J. Morales, Gonzalo Fernández-de-Córdoba:
The Walrasian output beats the market. 209-212 - Omkar D. Palsule-Desai:
Y. Narahari, D. Garg, R. Narayanam and H. Prakash: Game theoretic problems in network economics and mechanism design solutions - Springer-Verlag, London, 2009, 274 pp, Price USD 99.00. 213-217
Volume 41, Number 2, May 2012
- David A. Malueg, Ram Orzach:
Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information. 219-254 - Youngsub Chun, Boram Park:
Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value. 255-270 - Duygu Yengin:
Characterizing the Shapley value in fixed-route traveling salesman problems with appointments. 271-299 - P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski:
Sequential share bargaining. 301-323 - Yi-Chun Chen, Jeffrey C. Ely, Xiao Luo:
Note on unawareness: Negative Introspection versus AU Introspection (and KU Introspection). 325-329 - Rafael Hortala-Vallve, Aniol Llorente-Saguer:
Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games. 331-343 - Walter O. Krawec:
Analyzing n-player impartial games. 345-367 - Dimitri Dubois, Marc Willinger, Phu Nguyen Van:
Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental stag-hunt games. 369-380 - Josep M. Izquierdo, Carles Rafels:
A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura). 381-395 - Xiaoshu Xu, Dan Levin, Lixin Ye:
Auctions with synergy and resale. 397-426 - Hans Gersbach, Volker Hahn:
Information acquisition and transparency in committees. 427-453
Volume 41, Number 3, August 2012
- Yasunori Okumura:
Spatial competition and collaboration networks. 455-472 - Sebastian Bervoets, Vincent Merlin:
Gerrymander-proof representative democracies. 473-488 - Ryoji Sawa:
Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. 489-496 - André Casajus:
Amalgamating players, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value. 497-515 - Julio González-Díaz, Federica Briata, Ignacio García-Jurado, Fioravante Patrone:
Essential collections for equilibrium concepts. 517-552 - Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper:
Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games. 553-564 - Markus Brunner, Kai Jörg Sandner:
Social comparison, group composition, and incentive provision. 565-602 - Haruo Imai, Hannu Salonen:
A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems. 603-622 - Gary E. Bolton, Jeannette E. Brosig-Koch:
How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication. 623-649 - Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala:
Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality. 651-669 - Cesaltina Pacheco Pires, Sílvia Ferreira Jorge:
Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination. 671-698 - Takuya Masuzawa:
Strong convexity of NTU games. 699-705 - Hans-Theo Normann, Brian Wallace:
The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma experiment. 707-718 - Lawrence Diffo Lambo, Bertrand Tchantcho, Joël Moulen:
Comparing influence theories in voting games under locally generated measures of dissatisfaction. 719-731
Volume 41, Number 4, November 2012
- Shmuel's introduction. 733
- Robert J. Aumann:
My scientific first-born. 735-736 - Mukul Majumdar, Seung Han Yoo:
Strategic analysis of influence peddling. 737-762 - Peter H. Knudsen, Lars Peter Østerdal:
Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results. 763-774 - Joseph M. Abdou:
Stability and index of the meet game on a lattice. 775-789 - Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno:
Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results. 791-808 - Guni Orshan, Peter Sudhölter:
Nonsymmetric variants of the prekernel and the prenucleolus. 809-828 - Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Biligbaatar Tumendemberel:
Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change. 829-849 - Hans Peters, Dries Vermeulen:
WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions for non-convex bargaining problems. 851-884 - Camelia Bejan, Juan Camilo Gómez:
Axiomatizing core extensions. 885-898 - Pedro Calleja, Carles Rafels, Stef Tijs:
Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games. 899-913 - Hans Peters, Peter Sudhölter:
Bezalel Peleg: a bibliography. 915-930
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