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ORCIDJournal of Economic Theory, Volume 102
Volume 102, Number 1, January 2002
- Michihiro Kandori:
Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring. 1-15 - Venkataraman Bhaskar, Eric van Damme:
Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring. 16-39 - Venkataraman Bhaskar, Ichiro Obara
:
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring. 40-69 - Michele Piccione:
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring. 70-83 - Jeffrey C. Ely, Juuso Välimäki:
A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma. 84-105 - Olivier Compte:
On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations. 106-150 - Olivier Compte:
On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private. 151-188 - George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris:
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring. 189-228 - Masaki Aoyagi:
Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication. 229-248
Volume 102, Number 2, February 2002
- Paolo Ghirardato, Massimo Marinacci:
Ambiguity Made Precise: A Comparative Foundation. 251-289 - S. Rao Aiyagari, Jeremy Greenwood, Ananth Seshadri:
Efficient Investment in Children. 290-321 - Peter Norman:
Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation. 322-353 - Stéphane Gauthier:
Determinacy and Stability under Learning of Rational Expectations Equilibria. 354-374 - Thomas Tröger:
Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach. 375-402 - Felix Kübler, Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Ivar Ekeland, Heracles M. Polemarchakis:
The Identification of Preferences from Equilibrium Prices under Uncertainty. 403-420 - Jean-Pierre Benoît:
Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties Are Permitted. 421-436 - Erik J. Balder:
A Unifying Pair of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Existence Results. 437-470 - Luís M. B. Cabral:
Increasing Dominance with No Efficiency Effect. 471-479 - Alejandro M. Manelli:
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Stage Games. 480-484
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