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Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 129
Volume 129, Number 1, July 2006
- Sandro Brusco:
Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments. 1-30 - Zoltán Hidvégi, Wenli Wang, Andrew B. Whinston:
Buy-price English auction. 31-56 - Hideo Konishi, M. Utku Ünver
:
Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems. 57-80 - Hector Chade:
Matching with noise and the acceptance curse. 81-113 - Paul J. Healy
:
Learning dynamics for mechanism design: An experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms. 114-149 - Ming Guo, Hui Ou-Yang:
Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk. 150-191 - Noam Nisan, Ilya Segal:
The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices. 192-224 - César Martinelli:
Would rational voters acquire costly information? 225-251 - Flavio Toxvaerd:
Time of the essence. 252-272
- Albert Kyle, Hui Ou-Yang, Wei Xiong:
Prospect theory and liquidation decisions. 273-288 - Oleksii Birulin
:
Public goods with congestion. 289-299
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