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Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 137
Volume 137, Number 1, November 2007
- Debraj Ray:

Introduction to development theory. 1-10 - Andrew F. Newman:

Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship. 11-26 - Maitreesh Ghatak

, Massimo Morelli
, Tomas Sjöström:
Entrepreneurial talent, occupational choice, and trickle up policies. 27-48 - Dilip Mookherjee

, Stefan Napel:
Intergenerational mobility and macroeconomic history dependence. 49-78 - Joseph Zeira

:
Wage inequality, technology, and trade. 79-103 - Gilles Saint-Paul:

Knowledge hierarchies in the labor market. 104-126 - Francisco M. Gonzalez:

Effective property rights, conflict and growth. 127-139 - Siwan Anderson:

Why the marriage squeeze cannot cause dowry inflation. 140-152
- Alejandro M. Manelli, Daniel R. Vincent:

Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly. 153-185 - Michael Peters:

The pre-marital investment game. 186-213 - Efe A. Ok, Yusufcan Masatlioglu

:
A theory of (relative) discounting. 214-245 - Siyang Xiong

, Charles Zhoucheng Zheng
:
Core equivalence theorem with production. 246-270 - Denis Gromb, David Martimort:

Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise. 271-299 - Nir Jaimovich:

Firm dynamics and markup variations: Implications for sunspot equilibria and endogenous economic fluctuations. 300-325 - Gustavo Bergantiños

, Juan J. Vidal-Puga
:
A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems. 326-352 - Pietro F. Peretto:

Corporate taxes, growth and welfare in a Schumpeterian economy. 353-382 - Nabil I. Al-Najjar

, Rann Smorodinsky
:
The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information. 383-403 - Moshe Levy:

Conditions for a CAPM equilibrium with positive prices. 404-415 - Christopher P. Chambers:

Ordinal aggregation and quantiles. 416-431 - Gurupdesh Pandher:

Arbitrage-free valuation of interest rate securities under forward curves with stochastic speed and acceleration. 432-459 - Sanjeev Goyal, Fernando Vega-Redondo:

Structural holes in social networks. 460-492 - Marco Slikker:

Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems. 493-511 - Todd B. Walker:

How equilibrium prices reveal information in a time series model with disparately informed, competitive traders. 512-537 - Alain Chateauneuf, Jürgen Eichberger, Simon Grant

:
Choice under uncertainty with the best and worst in mind: Neo-additive capacities. 538-567 - Martin Barbie

, Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul:
On the interaction between risk sharing and capital accumulation in a stochastic OLG model with production. 568-579 - Dirk Bergemann, Martin Pesendorfer

:
Information structures in optimal auctions. 580-609 - Seungjin Han

:
Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games. 610-626 - Daniel Cardona

, Clara Ponsati:
Bargaining one-dimensional social choices. 627-651 - Chiaki Hara, James Huang, Christoph Kuzmics

:
Representative consumer's risk aversion and efficient risk-sharing rules. 652-672 - Emilio Espino:

Equilibrium portfolios in the neoclassical growth model. 673-687 - Thomas Schwartz:

A procedural condition necessary and sufficient for cyclic social preference. 688-695
- Michel De Lara, Laurent Gilotte:

A tight sufficient condition for Radner-Stiglitz nonconcavity in the value of information. 696-708 - David Andolfatto

, Ed Nosal, Neil Wallace:
The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model. 709-715 - Larry G. Epstein, Massimo Marinacci

:
Mutual absolute continuity of multiple priors. 716-720 - Klaus Kultti

, Hannu Vartiainen:
Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, discounting, and Nash bargaining. 721-728 - David McAdams

:
On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions. 729-732 - Stefan Ambec:

Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints. 733-744 - Leon Yang Chu, David E. M. Sappington:

A note on optimal procurement contracts with limited direct cost inflation. 745-753 - Guido Cazzavillan, Patrick Pintus:

Dynamic inefficiency in an overlapping generations economy with production. 754-759

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