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ORCIDJournal of Economic Theory, Volume 145
Volume 145, Number 1, January 2010
- Dirk Krueger, Hanno Lustig:
When is market incompleteness irrelevant for the price of aggregate risk (and when is it not)? 1-41 - Satoru Takahashi:
Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play. 42-62 - Olivier Gossner, Johannes Hörner:
When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? 63-84 - Archishman Chakraborty, Alessandro Citanna, Michael Ostrovsky
:
Two-sided matching with interdependent values. 85-105 - Fuhito Kojima, Mihai Manea:
Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism. 106-123 - Joel Peress:
The tradeoff between risk sharing and information production in financial markets. 124-155 - Naveen Khanna, Mark Schroder:
Optimal debt contracts and product market competition with exit and entry. 156-188 - P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski:
One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities. 189-215 - Marcin Peski:
Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics. 216-248 - Timothy Van Zandt:
Interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium on universal type spaces for supermodular games. 249-263 - Ludovic Renou, Karl H. Schlag:
Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty. 264-286 - Jang-Ting Guo, Sharon G. Harrison:
Indeterminacy with no-income-effect preferences and sector-specific externalities. 287-300 - Felix Kubler, Karl Schmedders:
Competitive equilibria in semi-algebraic economies. 301-330 - Sushama Murty:
Externalities and fundamental nonconvexities: A reconciliation of approaches to general equilibrium externality modeling and implications for decentralization. 331-353 - Maciej K. Dudek:
A consistent route to randomness. 354-381
- Randall Wright:
A uniqueness proof for monetary steady state. 382-391 - Kasie Jean, Stanislav Rabinovich, Randall Wright:
On the multiplicity of monetary equilibria: Green-Zhou meets Lagos-Wright. 392-401 - Bo Chen:
A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring. 402-420 - Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau:
Essential equilibria in normal-form games. 421-431 - Christopher P. Chambers, Takashi Hayashi:
Bayesian consistent belief selection. 432-439
Volume 145, Number 2, March 2010
- Christian List, Ben Polak:
Introduction to judgment aggregation. 441-466 - Klaus Nehring, Clemens Puppe:
Abstract Arrowian aggregation. 467-494 - Elad Dokow, Ron Holzman:
Aggregation of binary evaluations. 495-511 - Franz Dietrich, Christian List:
Majority voting on restricted domains. 512-543 - Elad Dokow, Ron Holzman:
Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions. 544-561 - Franz Dietrich, Philippe Mongin:
The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation. 562-582 - Klaus Nehring, Clemens Puppe:
Justifiable group choice. 583-602 - Franz Dietrich:
The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications. 603-638
- Giuseppe Moscarini, Francesco Squintani:
Competitive experimentation with private information: The survivor's curse. 639-660 - Stefan Krasa, Mattias Polborn:
The binary policy model. 661-688 - Jack Ochs, In-Uck Park:
Overcoming the coordination problem: Dynamic formation of networks. 689-720 - Maxim Ivanov:
Informational control and organizational design. 721-751 - Daisuke Oyama, Olivier Tercieux:
Robust equilibria under non-common priors. 752-784 - Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg:
Self-admissible sets. 785-811 - Christian Gollier:
Ecological discounting. 812-829 - Elyès Jouini, Jean-Michel Marin, Clotilde Napp:
Discounting and divergence of opinion. 830-859
- Andreas Schabert:
Monetary policy under a fiscal theory of sovereign default. 860-868 - Maxim Ivanov:
Communication via a strategic mediator. 869-884
Volume 145, Number 3, May 2010
- Philip H. Dybvig, Hong Liu:
Lifetime consumption and investment: Retirement and constrained borrowing. 885-907 - Borys Grochulski, Tomasz Piskorski:
Risky human capital and deferred capital income taxation. 908-943 - Cristina Arellano, Jonathan Heathcote:
Dollarization and financial integration. 944-973 - Árpád Ábrahám, Eva Cárceles-Poveda:
Endogenous trading constraints with incomplete asset markets. 974-1004 - Davide Debortoli, Ricardo Nunes:
Fiscal policy under loose commitment. 1005-1032 - Martin Bodenstein:
Trade elasticity of substitution and equilibrium dynamics. 1033-1059 - David R. Stockman:
Balanced-budget rules: Chaos and deterministic sunspots. 1060-1085 - V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, Frank Riedel:
On equilibrium prices in continuous time. 1086-1112 - Aloisio Araujo, Humberto Moreira:
Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition. 1113-1141 - Laurens Cherchye, Bram De Rock, Frederic Vermeulen:
An Afriat Theorem for the collective model of household consumption. 1142-1163 - Artyom Shneyerov, Adam Chi Leung Wong:
The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms. 1164-1187 - Audrey Hu, Steven A. Matthews, Liang Zou:
Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions. 1188-1202 - Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan:
Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions. 1203-1223 - Andrei Barbos:
Context effects: A representation of choices from categories. 1224-1243 - Adib Bagh:
Variational convergence: Approximation and existence of equilibria in discontinuous games. 1244-1268
- Lars Ehlers, Aytek Erdil:
Efficient assignment respecting priorities. 1269-1282 - Robert Molzon, Daniela Puzzello:
On the observational equivalence of random matching. 1283-1301 - Pierre-Andre Chiappori:
Testable implications of transferable utility. 1302-1317
Volume 145, Number 4, July 2010
- Giuseppe Moscarini, Randall Wright:
Introduction to Search Theory and Applications. 1319-1324 - Ehsan Ebrahimy, Robert Shimer:
Stock-flow matching. 1325-1353 - Jan Eeckhout, Philipp Kircher:
Sorting versus screening: Search frictions and competing mechanisms. 1354-1385 - James Albrecht, Axel Anderson, Susan Vroman:
Search by committee. 1386-1407 - Ken Burdett, Melvyn Coles:
Wage/tenure contracts with heterogeneous firms. 1408-1435 - Rasmus Lentz:
Sorting by search intensity. 1436-1452 - Guido Menzio, Shouyong Shi:
Block recursive equilibria for stochastic models of search on the job. 1453-1494 - David Andolfatto:
Essential interest-bearing money. 1495-1507 - Ricardo Lagos:
Some results on the optimality and implementation of the Friedman rule in the Search Theory of Money. 1508-1524 - Daniel Sanches, Stephen D. Williamson:
Money and credit with limited commitment and theft. 1525-1549 - Rafael Silveira, Randall Wright:
Search and the market for ideas. 1550-1573 - Darrell Duffie, Semyon Malamud, Gustavo Manso:
The relative contributions of private information sharing and public information releases to information aggregation. 1574-1601
Volume 145, Number 5, September 2010
- Jose Apesteguia, Steffen Huck, Jörg Oechssler, Simon Weidenholzer:
Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior: Theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust. 1603-1617 - S. Boragan Aruoba, Sanjay K. Chugh:
Optimal fiscal and monetary policy when money is essential. 1618-1647 - Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno:
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? 1648-1674 - Philip Bond, Hülya Eraslan:
Information-based trade. 1675-1703 - John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima:
Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts. 1704-1723 - Alexander Westkamp:
Market structure and matching with contracts. 1724-1738 - Thayer Morrill:
The roommates problem revisited. 1739-1756 - Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler:
Simplicity and likelihood: An axiomatic approach. 1757-1775 - Massimo Marinacci, Luigi Montrucchio:
Unique solutions for stochastic recursive utilities. 1776-1804 - Nina Baranchuk, Philip H. Dybvig, Jun Yang:
Renegotiation-proof contracting, disclosure, and incentives for efficient investment. 1805-1836 - Jordi Mondria:
Portfolio choice, attention allocation, and price comovement. 1837-1864 - Makoto Watanabe:
A model of merchants. 1865-1889 - Yann Bramoullé, Gilles Saint-Paul:
Research cycles. 1890-1920 - Pierre Yared:
A dynamic theory of war and peace. 1921-1950 - Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski:
Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. 1951-1967 - Rabah Amir, Filomena Garcia, Malgorzata Knauff:
Symmetry-breaking in two-player games via strategic substitutes and diagonal nonconcavity: A synthesis. 1968-1986 - V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha:
Interim efficiency with MEU-preferences. 1987-2017
- Donald C. Keenan, Arthur Snow:
Greater prudence and greater downside risk aversion. 2018-2026 - Michel Denuit, Louis Eeckhoudt:
Stronger measures of higher-order risk attitudes. 2027-2036 - Bernard Lebrun:
Revenue ranking of first-price auctions with resale. 2037-2043 - Brian Hill:
An additively separable representation in the Savage framework. 2044-2054
Volume 145, Number 6, November 2010
- Borys Grochulski, Narayana Kocherlakota:
Nonseparable preferences and optimal social security systems. 2055-2077 - Matthew Mitchell, Yuzhe Zhang:
Unemployment insurance with hidden savings. 2078-2107 - Benjamin Lester:
Directed search with multi-vacancy firms. 2108-2132 - Pablo Beker, Subir Chattopadhyay:
Consumption dynamics in general equilibrium: A characterisation when markets are incomplete. 2133-2185 - Rose-Anne Dana, Cuong Le Van:
Overlapping risk adjusted sets of priors and the existence of efficient allocations and equilibria with short-selling. 2186-2202 - Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky, Jonathan Weinstein:
Testing theories with learnable and predictive representations. 2203-2217 - Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn, Markus Walzl:
Stochastic stability for roommate markets. 2218-2240 - Hitoshi Matsushima, Koichi Miyazaki, Nobuyuki Yagi:
Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information. 2241-2259 - Alia Gizatulina, Martin F. Hellwig:
Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents. 2260-2281 - Sushil Bikhchandani:
Information acquisition and full surplus extraction. 2282-2308 - Timothy N. Cason, Daniel Friedman, Ed Hopkins:
Testing the TASP: An experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria. 2309-2331 - Christopher P. Chambers, Federico Echenique, Eran Shmaya:
On behavioral complementarity and its implications. 2332-2355 - Akira Okada:
The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games. 2356-2379 - Bhaskar Dutta, Lars Ehlers, Anirban Kar:
Externalities, potential, value and consistency. 2380-2411
- Arantxa Jarque:
Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence. 2412-2423 - Francis Bloch, Geoffroy de Clippel:
Cores of combined games. 2424-2434 - Cuong Le Van, Katheline Schubert, Tu Anh Nguyen:
With exhaustible resources, can a developing country escape from the poverty trap? 2435-2447 - Jacco J. J. Thijssen:
Preemption in a real option game with a first mover advantage and player-specific uncertainty. 2448-2462 - Gabriel D. Carroll:
An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences. 2463-2470 - José A. García-Martínez:
Selectivity in hierarchical social systems. 2471-2482 - Konrad Grabiszewski:
Kernel-based type spaces. 2483-2495
- Ludwig Ressner, Matti Liski, Juan-Pablo Montero:
Corrigendum to "Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly" [J. Econ. Theory 131 (1) (2006) 212-230]. 2496-2497 - Laurent Lamy:
Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268]. 2498-2504
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