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ORCIDJournal of Economic Theory, Volume 148
Volume 148, Number 1, January 2013
- Christian Hellwig, Karl Shell:
Announcement. 1 - Matthew O. Jackson
, Xu Tan:
Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting. 2-30 - John B. Donaldson, Natalia Gershun, Marc P. Giannoni:
Some unpleasant general equilibrium implications of executive incentive compensation contracts. 31-63 - Itay P. Fainmesser:
Social networks and unraveling in labor markets. 64-103 - Juan Carlos Carbajal, Jeffrey C. Ely:
Mechanism design without revenue equivalence. 104-133 - Nenad Kos, Matthias Messner:
Extremal incentive compatible transfers. 134-164 - Tilman Börgers, Ángel Hernando-Veciana, Daniel Krähmer:
When are signals complements or substitutes? 165-195 - Carlos Oyarzun, Rajiv Sarin:
Learning and risk aversion. 196-225 - Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Christoph Kuzmics:
Hidden symmetries and focal points. 226-258 - Shin Sato:
A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one. 259-278 - Takashi Hayashi:
Smallness of a commodity and partial equilibrium analysis. 279-305 - Michael Sattinger:
Safety first consumption. 306-321 - Kenichi Ueda:
Banks as coordinators of economic growth and stability: Microfoundation for macroeconomy with externality. 322-352 - Ryo Arawatari, Tetsuo Ono:
Inequality, mobility and redistributive politics. 353-375
- Alp E. Atakan, Mehmet Ekmekci:
A two-sided reputation result with long-run players. 376-392 - Jingfeng Lu, Lixin Ye:
Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs. 393-408 - Heiner Schumacher:
Imitating cooperation and the formation of long-term relationships. 409-417 - Fei Shi:
Comment on "On the co-existence of conventions" [J. Econ. Theory 107 (2002) 145-155]. 418-421
Volume 148, Number 2, March 2013
- Alessandro Pavan, Ricardo Lagos, Marciano M. Siniscalchi, Xavier Vives:
Editorial. 423
- Georgy Artemov, Takashi Kunimoto, Roberto Serrano:
Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine. 424-447 - Mark Armstrong:
A more general theory of commodity bundling. 448-472 - Zvika Neeman, Gregory Pavlov:
Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design. 473-501 - Jérôme Renault, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille:
Dynamic sender-receiver games. 502-534 - Olivier Bochet, Rahmi Ilkiliç, Hervé Moulin:
Egalitarianism under earmark constraints. 535-562 - Mark Loewenstein, Gregory A. Willard:
Consumption and bubbles. 563-600 - Alice Hsiaw:
Goal-setting and self-control. 601-626 - Biung-Ghi Ju:
Coalitional manipulation on networks. 627-662 - Eric Danan, Thibault Gajdos, Jean-Marc Tallon:
Aggregating sets of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities. 663-688 - Cheng-Zhong Qin, Chun-Lei Yang:
Finite-order type spaces and applications. 689-719 - Monisankar Bishnu:
Linking consumption externalities with optimal accumulation of human and physical capital and intergenerational transfers. 720-742 - Daniel Friedman, Daniel N. Ostrov:
Evolutionary dynamics over continuous action spaces for population games that arise from symmetric two-player games. 743-777
- Colin Decker, Elliott H. Lieb, Robert J. McCann, Benjamin K. Stephens:
Unique equilibria and substitution effects in a stochastic model of the marriage market. 778-792 - Conal Duddy, Ashley Piggins:
Many-valued judgment aggregation: Characterizing the possibility/impossibility boundary. 793-805 - Costas Azariadis, Leo Kaas:
Endogenous credit limits with small default costs. 806-824 - Yannick Viossat, Andriy Zapechelnyuk:
No-regret dynamics and fictitious play. 825-842 - Costas Azariadis, Been-Lon Chen, Chia-Hui Lu, Yin-Chi Wang:
A two-sector model of endogenous growth with leisure externalities. 843-857 - Hitoshi Matsushima:
Behavioral aspects of arbitrageurs in timing games of bubbles and crashes. 858-870
Volume 148, Number 3, May 2013
- Santiago Oliveros:
Abstention, ideology and information acquisition. 871-902 - Pietro Ortoleva:
The price of flexibility: Towards a theory of Thinking Aversion. 903-934 - Gary Biglaiser, Jacques Crémer, Gergely Dobos:
The value of switching costs. 935-952 - Michael Peters, Cristián Troncoso-Valverde:
A folk theorem for competing mechanisms. 953-973 - Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci, Luigi Montrucchio:
Ambiguity and robust statistics. 974-1049 - Shurojit Chatterji, M. Remzi Sanver, Arunava Sen:
On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions. 1050-1073 - Juan Carlos Carbajal, Andrew McLennan, Rabee Tourky:
Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains. 1074-1101 - Yves Sprumont:
Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: Beyond the Groves mechanisms. 1102-1121 - M. Ali Khan, Kali P. Rath, Yeneng Sun, Haomiao Yu:
Large games with a bio-social typology. 1122-1149 - Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau:
TFP during a credit crunch. 1150-1178 - James J. Anton, Gary Biglaiser:
Quality, upgrades and equilibrium in a dynamic monopoly market. 1179-1212 - Paavo Miettinen:
Information acquisition during a Dutch auction. 1213-1225
- William Fuchs, Andrzej Skrzypacz:
Bridging the gap: Bargaining with interdependent values. 1226-1236 - Takeshi Momi:
Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents. 1237-1254 - Elyès Jouini, Clotilde Napp, Diego Nocetti:
On multivariate prudence. 1255-1267 - Fei Li, Can Tian:
Directed search and job rotation. 1268-1281 - Marina Núñez, Carles Rafels:
Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market. 1282-1291 - Manuel Bagues, Maria J. Perez-Villadoniga:
Why do I like people like me? 1292-1299
Volume 148, Number 4, July 2013
- Alain Delacroix, Shouyong Shi:
Pricing and signaling with frictions. 1301-1332 - Florian Scheuer:
Adverse selection in credit markets and regressive profit taxation. 1333-1360 - Simon Grant, Ben Polak:
Mean-dispersion preferences and constant absolute uncertainty aversion. 1361-1398 - Itzhak Gilboa, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler:
Dynamics of inductive inference in a unified framework. 1399-1432 - Jürgen Eichberger, Ani Guerdjikova:
Ambiguity, data and preferences for information - A case-based approach. 1433-1462 - Jawwad Noor:
Removed preferences. 1463-1486 - Anna Gumen, Andrei Savochkin:
Dynamically stable preferences. 1487-1508 - Pär Holmberg, David Newbery, Daniel Ralph:
Supply function equilibria: Step functions and continuous representations. 1509-1551 - Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, Bram De Rock:
The empirical content of Cournot competition. 1552-1581 - Rose-Anne Dana, Frank Riedel:
Intertemporal equilibria with Knightian uncertainty. 1582-1605 - Guillaume Carlier, Rose-Anne Dana:
Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known. 1606-1623 - Rodolfo G. Campos:
Risk-sharing and crises. Global games of regime change with endogenous wealth. 1624-1658 - In-Koo Cho, Akihiko Matsui:
Search theory, competitive equilibrium, and the Nash bargaining solution. 1659-1688
- Marco Mariotti, Roberto Veneziani:
On the impossibility of complete Non-Interference in Paretian social judgements. 1689-1699 - Terence R. Johnson:
Matching through position auctions. 1700-1713 - Shiran Rachmilevitch:
Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions. 1714-1725 - Laurens de Haan, Casper G. de Vries, Chen Zhou:
The number of active bidders in internet auctions. 1726-1736 - Elena Del Rey, Miguel-Angel Lopez-Garcia:
Optimal education and pensions in an endogenous growth model. 1737-1750
Volume 148, Number 5, September 2013
- Andrea Galeotti, Christian Ghiglino, Francesco Squintani:
Strategic information transmission networks. 1751-1769 - Laurence Jacquet, Etienne Lehmann, Bruno Van der Linden:
Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses. 1770-1805 - Roozbeh Hosseini, Larry E. Jones, Ali Shourideh:
Optimal contracting with dynastic altruism: Family size and per capita consumption. 1806-1840 - George J. Mailath, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden:
Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications. 1841-1861 - Gilat Levy, Ronny Razin:
Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda. 1862-1890 - Takuo Sugaya, Satoru Takahashi:
Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring. 1891-1928 - Yasuyuki Miyahara, Tadashi Sekiguchi:
Finitely repeated games with monitoring options. 1929-1952 - Tapan Mitra, Gerhard Sorger:
On Ramsey's conjecture. 1953-1976 - Carine Nourry, Thomas Seegmuller, Alain Venditti:
Aggregate instability under balanced-budget consumption taxes: A re-examination. 1977-2006 - Yang K. Lu:
Optimal policy with credibility concerns. 2007-2032 - Christian Seel, Philipp Strack:
Gambling in contests. 2033-2048 - Andriy Zapechelnyuk:
Eliciting information from a committee. 2049-2067 - Seungjin Han:
Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty. 2068-2095 - Jun Zhang, Ruqu Wang:
Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining. 2096-2123 - Davide Dottori, Fernanda Estevan, I-Ling Shen:
Reshaping the schooling system: The role of immigration. 2124-2149
- Avidit Acharya, Juan Ortner:
Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining. 2150-2163 - Tapan Mitra, Geir B. Asheim, Wolfgang Buchholz, Cees Withagen:
Characterizing the sustainability problem in an exhaustible resource model. 2164-2182 - Ville Korpela:
A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation. 2183-2193
Volume 148, Number 6, November 2013
- Hülya Eraslan, Andrew McLennan:
Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining. 2195-2222 - Levon Barseghyan, Marco Battaglini, Stephen Coate:
Fiscal policy over the real business cycle: A positive theory. 2223-2265 - Guido Menzio, Shouyong Shi, Hongfei Sun:
A monetary theory with non-degenerate distributions. 2266-2312 - Ohad Kadan, Jeroen M. Swinkels:
On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach. 2313-2343 - Anton Kolotilin, Hao Li, Wei Li:
Optimal limited authority for principal. 2344-2382 - Sandrine Ollier, Lionel Thomas:
Ex post participation constraint in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard. 2383-2403 - Pauli Murto, Juuso Välimäki:
Delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information. 2404-2435 - Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed:
Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions. 2436-2466 - Gil Riella:
Preference for Flexibility and Dynamic Consistency. 2467-2482 - Edouard Challe, François Le Grand, Xavier Ragot:
Incomplete markets, liquidation risk, and the term structure of interest rates. 2483-2519 - Tai-Wei Hu, Guillaume Rocheteau:
On the coexistence of money and higher-return assets and its social role. 2520-2560 - Pierre M. Picard, Takatoshi Tabuchi:
On microfoundations of the city. 2561-2582 - Laurent Mathevet, Jakub Steiner:
Tractable dynamic global games and applications. 2583-2619 - Christian Basteck, Tijmen R. Daniëls, Frank Heinemann:
Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities. 2620-2637 - Marion Oury:
Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games. 2638-2665 - Rida Laraki, Panayotis Mertikopoulos:
Higher order game dynamics. 2666-2695 - Alan D. Miller:
Community standards. 2696-2705
- Liqun Liu, Jack Meyer:
Substituting one risk increase for another: A method for measuring risk aversion. 2706-2718 - Raouf Boucekkine, Carmen Camacho, Giorgio Fabbri:
Spatial dynamics and convergence: The spatial AK model. 2719-2736 - René van den Brink, Gerard van der Laan, Nigel Moes:
A strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for cycle-free graph games. 2737-2748 - Vitor Farinha Luz:
Surplus extraction with rich type spaces. 2749-2762
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