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ORCIDJournal of Economic Theory, Volume 163
Volume 163, May 2016
- Yulei Luo
, Eric R. Young:
Induced uncertainty, market price of risk, and the dynamics of consumption and wealth. 1-41 - Byung-Soo Lee:
Admissibility and assumption. 42-72 - Hong Liu, Yajun Wang:
Market making with asymmetric information and inventory risk. 73-109 - Claudio Michelacci, Josep Pijoan-Mas:
Labor supply with job assignment under balanced growth. 110-140 - Jonas Häckner, Mathias Herzing:
Welfare effects of taxation in oligopolistic markets. 141-166
- Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson:
Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions. 167-177
- Jun Xiao:
Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes. 178-221 - J. Aislinn Bohren:
Informational herding with model misspecification. 222-247 - Sanxi Li, Hailin Sun, Tong Wang, Jun Yu:
Assortative matching and risk sharing. 248-275 - Jernej Copic, Clara Ponsati:
Optimal robust bilateral trade: Risk neutrality. 276-287 - Shankha Chakraborty, Jon C. Thompson, Etienne B. Yehoue:
The culture of entrepreneurship. 288-317 - Akira Okada:
A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: Verifiable types. 318-341 - Penélope Hernández, Eilon Solan:
Bounded computational capacity equilibrium. 342-364 - Thomas Sampson:
Assignment reversals: Trade, skill allocation and wage inequality. 365-409 - Peter M. DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer, Yishay Mansour:
Robust option pricing: Hannan and Blackwell meet Black and Scholes. 410-434 - Lucas Rentschler, Theodore L. Turocy:
Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case. 435-466 - Satyajit Chatterjee, Burcu Eyigungor:
Continuous Markov equilibria with quasi-geometric discounting. 467-494 - Maximilian Mihm:
Reference dependent ambiguity. 495-524 - Kiminori Matsuyama, Iryna Sushko, Laura Gardini:
Revisiting the model of credit cycles with Good and Bad projects. 525-556 - Felix J. Bierbrauer, Nick Netzer:
Mechanism design and intentions. 557-603 - Bing Han, Ya Tang, Liyan Yang:
Public information and uninformed trading: Implications for market liquidity and price efficiency. 604-643
- Chao Gu, Randall Wright:
Monetary mechanisms. 644-657
- John Duggan:
Limits of acyclic voting. 658-683 - Rabah Amir, Natalia Lazzati:
Endogenous information acquisition in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities. 684-698 - Rohan Dutta, Ryosuke Ishii:
Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination. 699-727 - Mehmet Barlo, Guilherme Carmona, Hamid Sabourian:
Bounded memory Folk Theorem. 728-774
- Christopher P. Chambers, Ce Liu, Seung-Keun Martinez:
A test for risk-averse expected utility. 775-785
- William A. Branch, Bruce McGough:
Heterogeneous beliefs and trading inefficiencies. 786-818
- Bernardo Guimaraes, Ana Elisa Pereira:
QWERTY is efficient. 819-825
- Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin, Muhamet Yildiz:
Common belief foundations of global games. 826-848 - Daniel Krähmer, Eugen Kovác:
Optimal sequential delegation. 849-888 - Yakov Babichenko, Omer Tamuz:
Graphical potential games. 889-899 - Takashi Kamihigashi, John Stachurski:
Seeking ergodicity in dynamic economies. 900-924 - Debasis Mishra:
Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains. 925-954 - Eddie Dekel, Amanda Friedenberg, Marciano M. Siniscalchi:
Lexicographic beliefs and assumption. 955-985
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