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Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 170
Volume 170, July 2017
- Daniel P. O'Brien:

All-units discounts and double moral hazard. 1-28 - James Schummer

, Azar Abizada:
Incentives in landing slot problems. 29-55 - Christoph Kuzmics

, Jan-Henrik Steg
:
On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget. 56-69 - Juan Sebastián Lleras

, Yusufcan Masatlioglu
, Daisuke Nakajima, Erkut Y. Ozbay:
When more is less: Limited consideration. 70-85 - Nikolaus Schweizer

, Nora Szech:
Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release. 86-111 - David M. Frankel

:
Efficient ex-ante stabilization of firms. 112-144 - Alexander S. Nesterov:

Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms. 145-168 - Matías Núñez, Dimitrios Xefteris

:
Implementation via approval mechanisms. 169-181 - Diego Cerdeiro, Marcin Dziubinski

, Sanjeev Goyal:
Individual security, contagion, and network design. 182-226 - In-Koo Cho

, Akihiko Matsui:
Foundation of competitive equilibrium with non-transferable utility. 227-265 - Antonio Cabrales

, Olivier Gossner, Roberto Serrano:
A normalized value for information purchases. 266-288 - Felipe Balmaceda

, Juan F. Escobar:
Trust in cohesive communities. 289-318 - Peter Troyan

:
Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values. 319-345 - Andreas Irmen, Amer Tabakovic:

Endogenous capital- and labor-augmenting technical change in the neoclassical growth model. 346-384 - Alia Gizatulina

, Martin F. Hellwig:
The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces. 385-416 - Leonardo Pejsachowicz

, Séverine Toussaert
:
Choice deferral, indecisiveness and preference for flexibility. 417-425 - John Duggan

:
Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections. 426-463

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