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Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 58
Volume 58, Number 1, July 2009
- Louis Eeckhoudt, Johanna Etner, Fred Schroyen:
The values of relative risk aversion and prudence: A context-free interpretation. 1-7 - Frederik Herzberg
:
Elementary non-Archimedean utility theory. 8-14 - Vladimir L. Levin:
New axiomatic characterizations of utilitarianism. 15-24 - Steven R. Beckman, W. James Smith, Buhong Zheng:
Measuring inequality with interval data. 25-34 - Geoffrey Pritchard, Mark C. Wilson
:
Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour. 35-57 - Gerhard J. Woeginger:
Threshold aggregation of multi-graded rankings. 58-63 - Ross Cressman, Maria Eugenia Gallego:
On the ranking of bilateral bargaining opponents. 64-83 - Artyom Jelnov, Yair Tauman:
The private value of a patent: A cooperative approach. 84-97 - Ryo Kawasaki
, Shigeo Muto:
Farsighted stability in provision of perfectly "Lumpy" public goods. 98-109 - Domenico Menicucci:
Harmful competition in all-pay auctions. 110-120 - Christian Trudeau
:
Network flow problems and permutationally concave games. 121-131 - Van Kolpin:
Pure strategy equilibria in large demographic summary games. 132-141 - Agnieszka Bielinska-Kwapisz:
Erratum to: "Sufficiency in Blackwell's theorem" [Math. Social Sci. 46(1) (2003) 21-25]. 142-144
Volume 58, Number 2, September 2009
- Klaus Ritzberger:
Price competition with population uncertainty. 145-157 - Hans Gersbach, Tobias Kleinschmidt:
Power to youth: Designing democracy for long-term well-being. 158-172 - Robert G. Chambers, Tigran Melkonyan:
Smoothing preference kinks with information. 173-189 - Marc Artzrouni:
The mathematics of Ponzi schemes. 190-201 - José M. Alonso-Meijide
, Mikel Álvarez-Mozos
, M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro
:
Values of games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. 202-213 - Lawrence Diffo Lambo, Bertrand Tchantcho, Joël Moulen:
A core of voting games with improved foresight. 214-225 - Burak Can, M. Remzi Sanver:
Stereotype formation as trait aggregation. 226-237 - Andreas Darmann, Christian Klamler
, Ulrich Pferschy
:
Maximizing the minimum voter satisfaction on spanning trees. 238-250 - Michael K. Miller:
Social choice theory without Pareto: The pivotal voter approach. 251-255 - Hideki Mizukami, Takuma Wakayama:
The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity. 256-264 - S. Subramanian:
The Arrow paradox with fuzzy preferences. 265-271 - Andrés Carvajal:
Statistical calibration: A simplification of Foster's proof. 272-277
Volume 58, Number 3, November 2009
- Hannu Salonen:
Common theories. 279-289 - Alexander Zimper
:
An epistemic model of an agent who does not reflect on reasoning processes. 290-309 - Erwin Amann
, Alex Possajennikov
:
On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information. 310-321 - Fabien Lange, Michel Grabisch:
Values on regular games under Kirchhoff's laws. 322-340 - Yoshio Kamijo
:
A linear proportional effort allocation rule. 341-353 - Anna E. Bargagliotti:
Aggregation and decision making using ranked data. 354-366 - Rana Barua, Satya R. Chakravarty
, Palash Sarkar:
Minimal-axiom characterizations of the Coleman and Banzhaf indices of voting power. 367-375 - Anatol Emre Sargin, Ali Ünlü
:
Inductive item tree analysis: Corrections, improvements, and comparisons. 376-392 - Mario Menegatti
:
Optimal prevention and prudence in a two-period model. 393-397
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