


default search action
Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 91
Volume 91, January 2018
- Ola Andersson, Cédric Argenton

, Jörgen W. Weibull:
Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game. 1-5 - Angie Mounir, Andrés Perea, Elias Tsakas:

Common belief in approximate rationality. 6-16 - Timothy Flannery

:
A new methodology for surveys and its application to forced response. 17-24 - Tatsuhito Kono

, Akio Kishi:
What is an appropriate welfare measure for efficiency of local public policies inducing migration? 25-35 - Takashi Kamihigashi:

A Simple optimality-based no-bubble theorem for deterministic sequential economies with strictly monotone preferences. 36-41 - Hannu Salonen, Mikko A. A. Salonen

:
Mutually best matches. 42-50 - Yizhaq Minchuk

, Aner Sela:
Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts. 51-55 - Marcelo Caffera, Juan Dubra, Nicolás Figueroa:

Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide. 56-61 - Matthew Harrison-Trainor, Wesley H. Holliday

, Thomas F. Icard III:
Inferring probability comparisons. 62-70 - Dirk Bethmann

:
An improvement to Jensen's inequality and its application to mating market clearing when paternity is uncertain. 71-74 - Kui Ou-Yang:

Equity, hierarchy, and ordinal social choice. 75-84 - John K. Dagsvik:

Invariance axioms and functional form restrictions in structural models. 85-95

manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.


Google
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Internet Archive Scholar
CiteSeerX
ORCID














