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ORCIDSocial Choice and Welfare, Volume 17
Volume 17, Number 1, January 2000
- Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly:
Information and preference aggregation. 3-24 - Hans Gersbach:
Public information and social choice. 25-31 - Prasanta K. Pattanaik, Kunal Sengupta:
On the structure of simple preference-based choice functions. 33-43 - Marco Mariotti:
Maximal symmetry and the Nash solution. 45-53 - Richard T. Boylan:
An optimal auction perspective on lobbying. 55-68 - Sandeep Baliga
, Sandro Brusco:
Collusion, renegotiation and implementation. 69-83 - John Duggan, Thomas Schwartz:
Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized. 85-93 - Michael Mandler:
Interpersonal comparisons of utility and the policy paralysis problem. 95-115 - Jon R. Neill:
The benefit and sacrifice principles of taxation: A synthesis. 117-124 - Guoqiang Tian:
Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism. 125-141 - H. C. Huang, Vincent C. H. Chua:
Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition. 143-155 - Brendan O'Flaherty:
Representatives and districts. 157-178 - Donald G. Saari:
Book Review. 179-188
Volume 17, Number 2, March 2000
- Ruth Ben-Yashar, Jacob Paroush:
A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem. 189-199 - Flip Klijn:
An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money. 201-215 - Indrajit Ray:
Consistency, dummy and independence of irrelevant strategies for strategic games. 217-222 - Coral del Río, Javier Ruiz-Castillo:
Intermediate inequality and welfare. 223-239 - Hans Gersbach:
Size and distributional uncertainty, public information and the information paradox. 241-246 - Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn:
Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity. 247-267 - Jean-François Laslier:
Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives. 269-282 - Jean-François Laslier:
Interpretation of electoral mixed strategies. 283-292 - Nicolas Gravel, Jean-François Laslier, Alain Trannoy:
Consistency between tastes and values: A universalization approach. 293-320 - Walter Bossert:
Welfarism and information invariance. 321-336 - Andranik Tangian:
Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society. 337-365 - Klaus Nehring:
Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences. 367-375
Volume 17, Number 3, May 2000
- Thierry Marchant:
Does the Borda rule provide more than a ranking? 381-391 - H. Reiju Mihara:
Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives. 393-402 - Donald G. Saari, Vincent R. Merlin:
A geometric examination of Kemeny's rule. 403-438 - Wilko Letterie, Otto H. Swank, Hendrik P. van Dalen:
When policy advisors cannot reach a consensus. 439-461 - Norman Schofield:
Institutional innovation, contingency and war: A review. 463-479 - Antonio Quesada:
Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions. 481-506 - Youngsub Chun:
Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems. 507-521 - Sungwhee Shin, Sang-Chul Suh:
Strategy-proofness and efficiency in a simple production economy. 523-532 - Efe A. Ok, Levent Koçkesen:
Negatively interdependent preferences. 533-558 - Mathieu Martin:
A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set. 559-565 - Maurice Salles:
Book review. 567-569
Volume 17, Number 4, August 2000
- Naoki Yoshihara:
A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies. 571-599 - Philippe De Donder:
Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation. 601-627 - Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan:
Extended preferences and freedom of choice. 629-637 - Rolf Aaberge:
Characterizations of Lorenz curves and income distributions. 639-653 - Francesco De Sinopoli:
Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule. 655-672 - José Luis García-Lapresta, Bonifacio Llamazares:
Aggregation of fuzzy preferences: Some rules of the mean. 673-690 - Donald G. Saari, Vincent Merlin:
Changes that cause changes. 691-705 - Serge-Christophe Kolm:
A historical introduction to normative economics. 707-738 - Anna B. Khmelnitskaya, John A. Weymark:
Social choice with independent subgroup utility scales. 739-748
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