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ORCIDSocial Choice and Welfare, Volume 18
Volume 18, Number 1, January 2001
- Thomas Schwartz:
From Arrow to cycles, instability, and chaos by untying alternatives. 1-22 - Ricardo Arlegi, Jorge Nieto:
Ranking opportunity sets: An approach based on the preference for flexibility. 23-36 - Mark Satterthwaite:
Strategy-proofness and markets. 37-58 - Fritz Grafe, Julius Grafe:
Social Welfare Functions which preserve distances. 59-64 - John Duggan
, Michel Le Breton:
Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments. 65-78 - Thomas C. Ratliff:
A comparison of Dodgson's method and Kemeny's rule. 79-89 - Arieh Gavious, Shlomo Mizrahi:
A continuous time model of the bandwagon effect in collective action. 91-105 - Valentino Dardanoni:
A pedagogical proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. 107-112 - Josep E. Peris, M. Carmen Sánchez:
Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: The fixed agenda framework. 113-127 - Sylvain J. Durand:
A note on monotonicity in iterated choice functions. 129-134 - Suryapratim Banerjee, Hideo Konishi, Tayfun Sönmez:
Core in a simple coalition formation game. 135-153 - Ruth Ben-Yashar, Shmuel Nitzan:
The robustness of optimal organizational architectures: A note on hierarchies and polyarchies. 155-163 - Buhong Zheng:
Poverty orderings: A graphical illustration. 165-178 - Antonio Romero-Medina:
More on preference and freedom. 179-191 - William V. Gehrlein, Fabrice Valognes:
Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference. 193-205
Volume 18, Number 2, April 2001
- Peter Fristrup, Hans Keiding:
Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus. 213-226 - Charles D. Horvath:
On the topological social choice problem. 227-250 - Matjaz Omladic, Vesna Omladic:
A linear algebra approach to non-transitive expected utility. 251-267 - Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler:
A cognitive model of individual well-being. 269-288 - Peter Klibanoff:
Characterizing uncertainty aversion through preference for mixtures. 289-301 - John Nachbar:
Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information. 303-326 - William Thomson:
On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation. 327-386
Volume 18, Number 3, July 2001
- Claude d'Aspremont, Peter J. Hammond:
An interview with John C. Harsanyi. 389-401 - Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn:
A nail-biting election. 409-414 - Donald G. Saari:
Analyzing a nail-biting election. 415-430 - Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé Machover:
The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting. 431-464 - Kjell Hausken, Matthias Mohr:
The value of a player in n-person games. 465-483 - Nicolas Gravel:
Review of Ethics out of Economics by John Broome. 485-495 - Siang Ng, Yew-Kwang Ng:
Welfare-reducing growth despite individual and government optimization. 497-506 - Hervé Crès:
Aggregation of coarse preferences. 507-525 - Eiichi Miyagawa:
Locating libraries on a street. 527-541 - H. Reiju Mihara:
Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof. 543-553 - Robert Delver, Herman Monsuur:
Stable sets and standards of behaviour. 555-570 - Norman Schofield:
Constitutions, voting and democracy: A review. 571-600 - Joaquín Pérez:
The Strong No Show Paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences. 601-616
Volume 18, Number 4, October 2001
- Salvador Barberà:
An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions. 619-653 - Matthew O. Jackson:
A crash course in implementation theory. 655-708 - Thierry Marchant:
The probability of ties with scoring methods: Some results. 709-735 - Ruth Ben-Yashar, Jacob Paroush:
Optimal decision rules for fixed-size committees in polychotomous choice situations. 737-746 - Jon R. Neill:
The political viability of a negative income tax. 747-757 - René van den Brink, Gerard van der Laan:
Core concepts for share vectors. 759-784 - Szilvia Pápai:
Strategyproof single unit award rules. 785-798 - Valentino Dardanoni, Peter Lambert:
Horizontal inequity comparisons. 799-816 - Robert C. Powers:
Nondictatorially independent pairs and Pareto. 817-822 - Vicki Knoblauch:
Using elections to represent preferences. 823-831
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