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Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 19
Volume 19, Number 1, January 2002
- Joaquim Silvestre:

Progress and conservation under Rawls's maximin principle. 1-27 - Wulf Gaertner, Jochen A. Jungeilges:

Evaluation via extended orderings: Empirical findings from Western and Eastern Europe. 29-55 - Pablo Amorós

:
Single-peaked preferences with several commodities. 57-67 - Kai-yuen Tsui:

Multidimensional poverty indices. 69-93 - Howard Margolis:

Pivotal voting and the emperor's new clothes. 95-111 - Walter Bossert, Marc Fleurbaey:

Equitable insurance premium schemes. 113-125 - Bettina Klaus

, Ton Storcken:
Choice correspondences for public goods. 127-154 - Jörg Naeve, Elisabeth Naeve-Steinweg:

Lexicographic measurement of the information contained in opportunity sets. 155-173 - Dolors Berga

:
Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes. 175-192 - Vincent Merlin, Monica Tataru, Fabrice Valognes:

On the likelihood of Condorcet's profiles. 193-206 - Rafael Salas

:
Multilevel interterritorial convergence and additive multidimensional inequality decomposition. 207-218 - Adam Meirowitz:

Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types. 219-236
Volume 19, Number 2, April 2002
- Hans Keiding, Bezalel Peleg:

Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium: A complete characterization. 241-263 - S. Subramanian, Manabi Majumdar:

On measuring deprivation adjusted for group disparities. 265-280 - Bhaskar Chakravorti, John P. Conley, Bart Taub

:
Probabilistic cheap talk. 281-294 - Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé Machover:

Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori? 295-312 - Arkadii Slinko:

On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules. 313-324 - Lars Ehlers:

Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences. 325-348 - Steven R. Beckman

, John P. Formby, W. James Smith, Buhong Zheng:
Envy, malice and Pareto efficiency: An experimental examination. 349-367 - Luis C. Corchón, M. Socorro Puy

:
Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology. 369-379 - Hervé Moulin:

The proportional random allocation of indivisible units. 381-413 - Dorothea Herreiner, Clemens Puppe:

A simple procedure for finding equitable allocations of indivisible goods. 415-430 - Peter C. Fishburn:

Acyclic sets of linear orders: A progress report. 431-447 - Antonio Quesada:

More on independent decisiveness and Arrow's theorem. 449-454 - John E. Roemer:

Equality of opportunity: A progress report. 455-471
Volume 19, Number 3, July 2002
- Daniel John Zizzo

:
Neurobiological measurements of cardinal utility: Hedonimeters or learning algorithms? 477-488 - Walter Bossert, Hans Peters:

Efficient solutions to bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points. 489-502 - William V. Gehrlein:

Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic. 503-512 - Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly:

Non-monotonicity does not imply the no-show paradox. 513-515 - Hans Maassen, Thom Bezembinder:

Generating random weak orders and the probability of a Condorcet winner. 517-532 - Annick Laruelle

, Vincent Merlin:
Different least square values, different rankings. 533-550 - Ignacio Ortuño-Ortin:

Ideological versus Downsian political competition. 551-567 - Stephen Ching, Lin Zhou

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Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules. 569-580 - Walter Trockel

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A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution. 581-586 - Estelle Cantillon, Antonio Rangel:

A graphical analysis of some basic results in social choice. 587-611 - Kaoru Ueda:

Oligopolization in collective rent-seeking. 613-626 - Anne van den Nouweland

, Stef Tijs, Myrna Holtz Wooders:
Axiomatization of ratio equilibria in public good economies. 627-636 - Michel Le Breton, John A. Weymark:

Social choice with analytic preferences. 637-657 - Miki Kato, Shinji Ohseto

:
Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies. 659-664 - Vincent C. H. Chua, C. H. Ueng, H. C. Huang:

A method for evaluating the behavior of power indices in weighted plurality games. 665-680 - Daniel Eckert, Benjamin Lane:

Anonymity, ordinal preference proximity and imposed social choices. 681-684 - Shasikanta Nandeibam

:
The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures. 685-705
Volume 19, Number 4, October 2002
- Edward M. Bolger:

Characterizations of two power indices for voting games with r alternatives. 709-721 - Claus-Jochen Haake, Matthias G. Raith, Francis Edward Su

:
Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems. 723-749 - Ryo-ichi Nagahisa, Makoto Tanaka:

An axiomatization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution when the feasible sets can be finite. 751-761 - Aldo Montesano:

Social loss with respect to the core of an economy. 763-767 - Francis Bloch, Stéphane Rottier:

Agenda control in coalition formation. 769-788 - Christian Kleiber

, Samuel Kotz:
A characterization of income distributions in terms of generalized Gini coefficients. 789-794 - Leonardo C. Gasparini:

On the measurement of unfairness An application to high school attendance in Argentina. 795-810 - Nir Dagan, Oscar Volij

, Eyal Winter
:
A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. 811-823 - Toru Hokari:

Monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions on convex games. 825-844 - René van den Brink

:
The apex power measure for directed networks. 845-867 - Javier Arin, Vincent Feltkamp:

Lorenz undominated allocations for TU-games: The weighted Coalitional Lorenz Solutions. 869-884 - Albert W. Marshall, Ingram Olkin, Friedrich Pukelsheim:

A majorization comparison of apportionment methods in proportional representation. 885-900 - César Martinelli

:
Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters. 901-919 - Geir B. Asheim

, Kjell Arne Brekke:
Sustainability when capital management has stochastic consequences. 921-940

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