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ORCIDSocial Choice and Welfare, Volume 42
Volume 42, Number 1, January 2014
- Maurice Salles:
'Social choice and welfare' at 30: its role in the development of social choice theory and welfare economics. 1-16 - Joaquín Pérez Ortega, Omar De la Cruz:
Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee. 17-30 - Florenz Plassmann, T. Nicolaus Tideman
:
How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections? 31-75 - Patrick Hummel:
Pre-election polling and third party candidates. 77-98 - Joe Neeman:
A law of large numbers for weighted plurality. 99-109 - James Green-Armytage:
Strategic voting and nomination. 111-138 - Julio González-Díaz, Ruud Hendrickx, Edwin Lohmann:
Paired comparisons analysis: an axiomatic approach to ranking methods. 139-169 - Asis Kumar Banerjee:
A multidimensional Lorenz dominance relation. 171-191 - Matthew Ryan:
Path independent choice and the ranking of opportunity sets. 193-213 - Reut Megidish, Aner Sela:
Sequential contests with synergy and budget constraints. 215-243 - Alex Voorhoeve:
Matthew D. Adler: Well-being and fair distribution: beyond cost-benefit analysis. 245-254
Volume 42, Number 2, February 2014
- William Thomson:
New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation. 255-277 - Sophie Bade:
Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange. 279-287 - Conan Mukherjee:
Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money. 289-311 - Matías Núñez, Jean-François Laslier:
Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections. 313-340 - Shrikant R. Chaudhari, Santosh S. Desai:
Transitive and acyclic rationality indicators of fuzzy choice functions on base domain. 341-365 - Alon Harel, Uzi Segal:
Utilitarianism and discrimination. 367-380 - Laurence Jacquet, Etienne Lehmann, Bruno Van der Linden:
Optimal income taxation with Kalai wage bargaining and endogenous participation. 381-402 - Laurence Jacquet:
Tagging and redistributive taxation with imperfect disability monitoring. 403-435 - Yosef Mealem, Shmuel Nitzan:
Equity and effectiveness of optimal taxation in contests under an all-pay auction. 437-464 - Iryna Topolyan:
Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions. 465-476 - Tao Li:
Expert advising under checks and balances. 477-502
Volume 42, Number 3, March 2014
- Sami Bibi, Jean-Yves Duclos, Abdelkrim Araar:
Mobility, taxation and welfare. 503-527 - Thomas Demuynck:
The computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto optimal choice behavior. 529-549 - Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein:
Minimal retentive sets in tournaments. 551-574 - Hiroyuki Sano:
Reciprocal rent-seeking contests. 575-596 - Kerstin Roeder:
Optimal taxes and pensions with myopic agents. 597-618 - Ivica Urban:
Contributions of taxes and benefits to vertical and horizontal effects. 619-645 - Alexander Tarasov:
Preferences and income effects in monopolistic competition models. 647-669 - Wu-Hsiung U. Huang:
Singularity and Arrow's paradox. 671-706 - Francesco Giovannoni, Daniel J. Seidmann:
Corruption and power in democracies. 707-734 - Berno Buechel:
Condorcet winners on median spaces. 735-750 - Marc Fleurbaey:
Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki: Majority judgment. Measuring, ranking, and electing. 751-755 - In memoriam Michael Dummett. 757-758
- In memoriam Ronald Dworkin. 759-760
Volume 42, Number 4, April 2014
- Miguel A. Sordo, Jorge Navarro, José María Sarabia:
Distorted Lorenz curves: models and comparisons. 761-780 - Joaquim Silvestre:
Utilitarianism and equality for quasilinear or Gorman-form preferences. 781-791 - Paula Jaramillo, Çagatay Kayi, Flip Klijn:
On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets. 793-811 - Tsuyoshi Adachi:
Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains. 813-830 - Shin Sato:
A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives. 831-851 - Eduardo Zambrano:
An axiomatization of the human development index. 853-872 - Franz Dietrich:
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation. 873-911 - John Cullinan, Samuel K. Hsiao, David Polett:
A Borda count for partially ordered ballots. 913-926 - Sébastien Courtin, Boniface Mbih, Issofa Moyouwou:
Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom? 927-940 - Christian Trudeau:
Characterizations of the cycle-complete and folk solutions for minimum cost spanning tree problems. 941-957 - Constanze Binder:
Plural identities and preference formation. 959-976 - Sandro Brusco, Luca Colombo, Umberto Galmarini:
Tax differentiation, lobbying, and welfare. 977-1006
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