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Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 46
Volume 46, Number 1, January 2016
- Arnaud Dellis, Mandar P. Oak

:
Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization. 1-38 - Ronen Shnayderman:

Ian Carter's non-evaluative theory of freedom and diversity: a critique. 39-55 - Bernard Gauthier, Jonathan Goyette:

Fiscal policy and corruption. 57-79 - Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Paul Harrenstein:

A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality. 81-91 - John Duggan

:
Preference exclusions for social rationality. 93-118 - Stefan Ambec, Yann Kervinio

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Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility. 119-155 - Jean Lainé

, Ali Ihsan Ozkes, M. Remzi Sanver:
Hyper-stable social welfare functions. 157-182 - James Green-Armytage, T. Nicolaus Tideman, Rafael Cosman:

Statistical evaluation of voting rules. 183-212 - Nicola Maaser

, Alexander Mayer:
Codecision in context: implications for the balance of power in the EU. 213-237
Volume 46, Number 2, February 2016
- Pau Balart

, Sabine Flamand
, Orestis Troumpounis
:
Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests. 239-262 - Felix Kölle

, Dirk Sliwka
, Nannan Zhou:
Heterogeneity, inequity aversion, and group performance. 263-286 - Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan:

Is majority consistency possible? 287-299 - Conal Duddy

, Ashley Piggins
, William S. Zwicker:
Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach. 301-333 - John E. Roemer, Pedro Rosa Dias:

Barefoot and footloose doctors: optimal resource allocation in developing countries with medical migration. 335-358 - Erwin Ooghe

, Erik Schokkaert
:
School accountability: can we reward schools and avoid pupil selection? 359-387 - King King Li

, Toru Suzuki:
Jury voting without objective probability. 389-406 - Gregory Ponthiere:

The contribution of improved joint survival conditions to living standards: an equivalent consumption approach. 407-449 - M. Josune Albizuri, Peter Sudhölter

:
Characterizations of the core of TU and NTU games with communication structures. 451-475
Volume 46, Number 3, March 2016
- Katherine Baldiga Coffman:

Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives. 477-494 - Sebastian Bervoets, Vincent Merlin:

On avoiding vote swapping. 495-509 - Ivan Balbuzanov

:
Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism. 511-520 - Jean-François Carpantier, Christelle Sapata:

Empirical welfare analysis: when preferences matter. 521-542 - Andrea Robbett:

Community dynamics in the lab. 543-568 - Takashi Hayashi:

Consistent updating of social welfare functions. 569-608 - Yuliya A. Veselova

:
The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models. 609-638 - Mitri Kitti:

Axioms for centrality scoring with principal eigenvectors. 639-653 - Benoit Decerf

, Martin Van der Linden
:
Fair social orderings with other-regarding preferences. 655-694 - Shaofang Qi:

A characterization of the n-agent Pareto dominance relation. 695-706
Volume 46, Number 4, April 2016
- William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley, Florenz Plassmann:

Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election? 707-747 - Kazuhiko Hashimoto, Hiroki Saitoh:

Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good. 749-766 - Arnold Polanski

:
Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer-seller networks. 767-776 - Bram Driesen:

Bargaining, conditional consistency, and weighted lexicographic Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions. 777-809 - Calin Arcalean, Ioana Schiopu:

Inequality, opting-out and public education funding. 811-837 - Mihir Bhattacharya:

Multilevel multidimensional consistent aggregators. 839-861 - Dmitriy Vorobyev

:
Participation in fraudulent elections. 863-892 - Kazuo Yamaguchi:

Borda winner in facility location problems on sphere. 893-898 - Javier Rivas

:
Private agenda and re-election incentives. 899-915 - Walter Bossert, Burak Can, Conchita D'Ambrosio

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Measuring rank mobility with variable population size. 917-931 - Orit Arzi, Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb:

Toss one's cake, and eat it too: partial divisions can improve social welfare in cake cutting. 933-954

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