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Synthese, Volume 106
Volume 106, Number 1, January 1996
- Jaakko Hintikka, Dag Prawitz:
Preface. 1 - Lilli Alanen:
Reconsidering Descartes's notion of the mind-body union. 3-20 - Peter Gärdenfors:
Mental representation, conceptual spaces and metaphors. 21-47 - David Pears:
Wittgenstein's criticism of cartesianism. 49-55 - Paul Ricoeur:
The crisis of the Cogito. 57-66 - Nick Zangwill:
Good old supervenience: Mental causation on the cheap. 67-101 - John Divers
:
Supervenience for operators. 103-112 - Gary Hatfield:
Review essay: The importance of the history of science for philosophy in general. 113-138
Volume 106, Number 2, February 1996
- Dorit Bar-On:
Anti-realism and speaker knowledge. 139-166 - Richard Montgomery:
The indeterminacy of color vision. 167-203 - Anthony Everett:
Qualia and vagueness. 205-226 - Martin Bunzl:
The logic of thought experiments. 227-240 - Steven Weinstein:
Undermind. 241-251 - Jaap van Brakel:
Interdiscourse or supervenience relations: The primacy of the manifest image. 253-297
Volume 106, Number 3, March 1996
- Editorial note. 299
- Joseph Brent:
Pursuing Peirce. 301-322 - Arthur W. Burks:
Peirce's evolutionary pragmatic idealism. 323-372 - Randall R. Dipert:
Reflections on iconicity, representation, and resemblance: Peirce's theory of signs, goodman on resemblance, and modern philosophies of language and mind. 373-397 - Robert Schwartz:
Symbols and thought. 399-407 - T. L. Short:
Review essay. 409-430 - International union of history and philosophy of science; division of logic, methodology and philosophy of science bulletin no.17. 431-443
- Call for papers. 445
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