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Synthese, Volume 120
Volume 120, Number 1, July 1999
- Alexander Bird

:
Explanation and Laws. 1-17 - Robert Callergård:

The Hypothesis Of Ether And Reid's Interpretation Of Newton's First Rule Of Philosophizing. 19-26 - Ilpo Halonen, Jaakko Hintikka:

Unification - It's Magnificent But Is It Explanation? 27-47 - Henrik Hallsten:

Deductive Chauvinism. 49-59 - Jan Faye:

Explanation Explained. 61-75 - Johannes Persson

:
The Determinables Of Explanatory Mechanisms. 77-87 - Marcel Quarfood:

The Individuality of Species: Some Reflections on the Debate. 89-94 - Gerhard Schurz:

Explanation as Unification. 95-114 - Rebecca Schweder:

Causal Explanation and Explanatory Selection. 115-124 - Matti Sintonen:

Why Questions, and Why Just Why-Questions? 125-135 - Max P. Urchs:

Complementary Explanations. 137-149
Volume 120, Number 2, August 1999
- Francis Y. Lin:

Chomsky On The 'Ordinary Language' View Of Language. 151-191 - Justin Leiber:

Language Without Linguistics. 193-211 - James D. McCawley:

Unconfirmed Sightings Of An 'Ordinary Language' Theory Of Language. 213-228 - Joseph G. Moore:

Propositions, Numbers, And The Problem Of Arbitrary Identification. 229-263 - William Lane Craig:

On Truth Conditions Of Tensed Sentence Types. 265-270 - David Cunning:

Agency And Consciousness. 271-294
Volume 120, Number 3, September 1999
- Andrzej Wisniewski:

Erotetic Logic And Explanation By Abnormic Hypotheses. 295-309 - Jeffrey R. Tiel:

The Dogma Of Kornblith's Naturalism. 311-324 - James W. McAllister:

Universal Regularities And Initial Conditions In Newtonian Physics. 325-343 - Mark A. Changizi:

Vagueness, Rationality And Undecidability: A Theory Of Why There Is Vagueness. 345-374 - Lee McIntyre:

Davidson And Social Scientific Laws. 375-394 - Leo K. C. Cheung:

The Proofs Of The Grundgedanke In Wittgenstein's Tractatus. 395-410 - Eddy M. Zemac:

The World Is Too Much. 411-418

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