default search action
Google
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Internet Archive Scholar
CiteSeerX
ORCIDSynthese, Volume 191
Volume 191, Number 1, January 2014
- Cyrille Imbert, Ryan Muldoon
, Jan Sprenger, Kevin J. S. Zollman:
Introduction, SI of Synthese "The collective dimension of science". 1-2 - Carlo Martini:
Experts in science: a view from the trenches. 3-15 - Thomas Boyer:
Is a bird in the hand worth two in the bush? Or, whether scientists should publish intermediate results. 17-35 - G. Jeroen de Ridder:
Epistemic dependence and collective scientific knowledge. 37-53 - Conor Mayo-Wilson:
Reliability of testimonial norms in scientific communities. 55-78 - Adam Green:
Evaluating distributed cognition. 79-95 - Jesús Zamora-Bonilla:
The nature of co-authorship: a note on recognition sharing and scientific argumentation. 97-108 - Krist Vaesen, Wybo Houkes:
Modelling the truth of scientific beliefs with cultural evolutionary theory. 109-125
Volume 191, Number 2, January 2014
- M. Chirimuuta:
Minimal models and canonical neural computations: the distinctness of computational explanation in neuroscience. 127-153 - Felipe De Brigard:
Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thinking. 155-185 - Philipp E. Koralus:
Attention, consciousness, and the semantics of questions. 187-211 - Alex Morgan:
Representations gone mental. 213-244 - Markus E. Schlosser:
The neuroscientific study of free will: A diagnosis of the controversy. 245-262 - Miguel Angel Sebastián:
Dreams: an empirical way to settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness. 263-285
Volume 191, Number 3, February 2014
- Luigi Secchi:
The main two arguments for probabilism are flawed. 287-295 - Leon de Bruin, Albert Newen:
The developmental paradox of false belief understanding: a dual-system solution. 297-320 - Bart Hollebrandse, Angeliek van Hout, Petra Hendriks:
Children's first and second-order false-belief reasoning in a verbal and a low-verbal task. 321-333 - Elske van der Vaart, Charlotte K. Hemelrijk:
'Theory of mind' in animals: ways to make progress. 335-354 - Maartje E. J. Raijmakers, Dorothy J. Mandell, Sara E. van Es, Marian Counihan:
Children's strategy use when playing strategic games. 355-370 - Cédric Dégremont, Lena Kurzen, Jakub Szymanik:
Exploring the tractability border in epistemic tasks. 371-408 - Lorenz Demey:
Agreeing to disagree in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic. 409-438 - Victor Kumar:
'Knowledge' as a natural kind term. 439-457 - Sam Baron:
Optimisation and mathematical explanation: doing the Lévy Walk. 459-479 - Francesco Berto, Jacopo Tagliabue:
The world is either digital or analogue. 481-497 - Matthieu Fontaine, Shahid Rahman:
Towards a semantics for the artifactual theory of fiction and beyond. 499-516 - Fred D'Agostino:
Verballed? Incommensurability 50 years on. 517-538 - Marco J. Nathan, Andrea Borghini:
Development and natural kinds - Some lessons from biology. 539-556 - Hao Tang:
"It is not a something, but not a nothing either!" - McDowell on Wittgenstein. 557-567 - Eugen Fischer:
Philosophical intuitions, heuristics, and metaphors. 569-606 - Robin McKenna:
Normative scorekeeping. 607-625
Volume 191, Number 4, March 2014
- Jeanne Peijnenburg, Sylvia Wenmackers:
Infinite regress in decision theory, philosophy of science, and formal epistemology. 627-628 - Paul Bartha, John Barker, Alan Hájek:
Satan, Saint Peter and Saint Petersburg - Decision theory and discontinuity at infinity. 629-660 - Hanti Lin:
On the regress problem of deciding how to decide. 661-670 - John D. Norton:
A material dissolution of the problem of induction. 671-690 - Benjamin Bewersdorf:
Infinitism and probabilistic justification. 691-699 - Frederik Herzberg:
The dialectics of infinitism and coherentism: inferential justification versus holism and coherence. 701-723
Volume 191, Number 5, March 2014
- Jens Harbecke:
The role of supervenience and constitution in neuroscientific research. 725-743 - Hans van Ditmarsch:
Dynamics of lying. 745-777 - Campbell Brown:
The composition of reasons. 779-800 - Robert Hudson:
Saving Pritchard's anti-luck virtue epistemology: the case of Temp. 801-815 - John Michael, Wayne Christensen, Søren Overgaard:
Mindreading as social expertise. 817-840 - Dolf Rami:
On the unification argument for the predicate view on proper names. 841-862 - Sjur K. Dyrkolbotn, Michal Walicki:
Propositional discourse logic. 863-899 - Anthony Shiver:
Mereological bundle theory and the identity of indiscernibles. 901-913 - Claudio Calosi:
Quantum mechanics and Priority Monism. 915-928 - Anika Fiebich:
Mindreading with ease? Fluency and belief reasoning in 4- to 5-year-olds. 929-944 - Yasha Rohwer:
Lucky understanding without knowledge. 945-959 - Bredo C. Johnsen:
Reclaiming Quine's epistemology. 961-988 - Colin Howson:
Finite additivity, another lottery paradox and conditionalisation. 989-1012 - Jonathan Waskan, Ian Harmon, Zachary Horne, Joseph Spino, John Clevenger:
Explanatory anti-psychologism overturned by lay and scientific case classifications. 1013-1035
Volume 191, Number 6, April 2014
- Luciano Floridi:
Information closure and the sceptical objection. 1037-1050 - Alexander R. Pruss:
Infinitesimals are too small for countably infinite fair lotteries. 1051-1057 - Robert William Fischer:
Why it doesn't matter whether the virtues are truth-conducive. 1059-1073 - Conal Duddy:
Reconciling probability theory and coherentism. 1075-1084 - Joseph Diekemper:
The existence of the past. 1085-1104 - Dan López de Sa:
Lewis vs Lewis on the problem of the many. 1105-1117 - Michael Hannon:
Fallibilism and the value of knowledge. 1119-1146 - Matthew Tugby:
Categoricalism, dispositionalism, and the epistemology of properties. 1147-1162 - Adrian Mitchell Currie:
Narratives, mechanisms and progress in historical science. 1163-1183 - Mauro Rossi:
Simulation theory and interpersonal utility comparisons reconsidered. 1185-1210 - Darrell P. Rowbottom:
Aimless science. 1211-1221 - Chris Ranalli:
Luck, propositional perception, and the Entailment Thesis. 1223-1247 - Pietro Galliani:
Transition semantics: the dynamics of dependence logic. 1249-1276 - Michael Rescorla:
A theory of computational implementation. 1277-1307 - Ramiro Caso:
Assertion and relative truth. 1309-1325 - Linton Wang, Wei-Fen Ma:
Comparative syllogism and counterfactual knowledge. 1327-1348
Volume 191, Number 7, May 2014
- Michael Baumgartner:
Exhibiting interpretational and representational validity. 1349-1373 - Rosanna Keefe:
What logical pluralism cannot be. 1375-1390 - Nathan Ballantyne:
Does luck have a place in epistemology? 1391-1407 - Stefan Lukits:
The principle of maximum entropy and a problem in probability kinematics. 1409-1431 - Weng Hong Tang:
Intentionality and partial belief. 1433-1450 - Nicolas Fillion, Robert M. Corless:
On the epistemological analysis of modeling and computational error in the mathematical sciences. 1451-1467 - Nir Fresco, Marty J. Wolf:
The instructional information processing account of digital computation. 1469-1492 - Anders Kraal:
The aim of Russell's early logicism: a reinterpretation. 1493-1510 - Jonathan Tallant:
Against mereological nihilism. 1511-1527 - Klemens Kappel, Emil F. L. Moeller:
Epistemic expressivism and the argument from motivation. 1529-1547 - Harmen Ghijsen:
Phenomenalist dogmatist experientialism and the distinctiveness problem. 1549-1566 - John P. Burgess:
On a derivation of the necessity of identity. 1567-1585 - Matthew Frise:
Speaking freely: on free will and the epistemology of testimony. 1587-1603 - Rafal Urbaniak:
Plural quantifiers: a modal interpretation. 1605-1626 - André Fuhrmann:
Knowability as potential knowledge. 1627-1648 - André Fuhrmann:
Erratum to: Knowability as potential knowledge. 1649
Volume 191, Number 8, May 2014
- Brendan Clarke, Bert Leuridan, Jon Williamson:
Modelling mechanisms with causal cycles. 1651-1681 - J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon:
A new maneuver against the epistemic relativist. 1683-1695 - Kristian Camilleri:
Toward a constructivist epistemology of thought experiments in science. 1697-1716 - Matt Lutz:
The pragmatics of pragmatic encroachment. 1717-1740 - Samuel Schindler:
Explanatory fictions - for real? 1741-1755 - Philip Kremer:
Indeterminacy of fair infinite lotteries. 1757-1760 - Preston J. Werner:
Seemings: still dispositions to believe. 1761-1774 - Victor Gijsbers, Leon de Bruin:
How agency can solve interventionism's problem of circularity. 1775-1791 - Pendaran Roberts:
Parsing the rainbow. 1793-1811 - J. P. Smit, Filip Buekens, Stan du Plessis:
Developing the incentivized action view of institutional reality. 1813-1830 - Alexander Rueger:
Idealized and perspectival representations: some reasons for making a distinction. 1831-1845 - Davide Rizza:
Arrow's theorem and theory choice. 1847-1856 - Matthew A. Benton, John Turri:
Iffy predictions and proper expectations. 1857-1866 - Anthony Robert Booth:
On some recent moves in defence of doxastic compatibilism. 1867-1880 - George Masterton:
What to do with a forecast? 1881-1907 - Alessandro Giordani:
On the factivity of implicit intersubjective knowledge. 1909-1923 - Daniel M. Hausman, Reuben Stern, Naftali Weinberger:
Systems without a graphical causal representation. 1925-1930 - Spyridon Orestis Palermos:
Knowledge and cognitive integration. 1931-1951
Volume 191, Number 9, June 2014
- Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, Kristoffer Ahlström-Vij, Klemens Kappel:
Rational trust. 1953-1955 - Karen Frost-Arnold:
The cognitive attitude of rational trust. 1957-1974 - Paul Faulkner:
The practical rationality of trust. 1975-1989 - Aron Vallinder, Erik J. Olsson:
Trust and the value of overconfidence: a Bayesian perspective on social network communication. 1991-2007 - Klemens Kappel:
Believing on trust. 2009-2028 - Katherine Hawley:
Partiality and prejudice in trusting. 2029-2045 - Katherine Hawley:
Erratum to: Partiality and prejudice in trusting. 2047
Volume 191, Number 10, July 2014
- Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Vanessa Jine Schweizer:
Objectivity and a comparison of methodological scenario approaches for climate change research. 2049-2088 - Keith A. Markus:
An incremental approach to causal inference in the behavioral sciences. 2089-2113 - Thibaut Giraud:
Constructing formal semantics from an ontological perspective. The case of second-order logics. 2115-2145 - Stephan Krämer:
Implicit commitment in theory choice. 2147-2165 - Franz Huber:
New foundations for counterfactuals. 2167-2193 - Christian Damböck:
Kuhn's notion of scientific progress: "Reduction" between incommensurable theories in a rigid structuralist framework. 2195-2213 - Sven Walter:
Willusionism, epiphenomenalism, and the feeling of conscious will. 2215-2238 - John R. Welch:
Plausibilistic coherence. 2239-2253 - Mark Staples:
Critical rationalism and engineering: ontology. 2255-2279 - Iris Loeb:
Towards transfinite type theory: rereading Tarski's Wahrheitsbegriff. 2281-2299 - Justin M. Dallmann:
A normatively adequate credal reductivism. 2301-2313 - Sandy C. Boucher:
What is a philosophical stance? Paradigms, policies and perspectives. 2315-2332 - Mark Pexton:
How dimensional analysis can explain. 2333-2351
Volume 191, Number 11, July 2014
- Frank Zenker, Carlo Proietti:
Editors' introduction: social dynamics and collective rationality. 2353-2358 - Peter Brössel, Anna-Maria A. Eder:
How to resolve doxastic disagreement. 2359-2381 - Gustavo Cevolani:
Truth approximation, belief merging, and peer disagreement. 2383-2401 - Fenrong Liu, Jeremy Seligman, Patrick Girard:
Logical dynamics of belief change in the community. 2403-2431 - George Masterton:
Topological variability of collectives and its import for social epistemology. 2433-2443 - Jens Christian Bjerring, Jens Ulrik Hansen, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen:
On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance. 2445-2470 - Rasmus K. Rendsvig:
Pluralistic ignorance in the bystander effect: informational dynamics of unresponsive witnesses in situations calling for intervention. 2471-2498 - Rogier De Langhe:
To specialize or to innovate? An internalist account of pluralistic ignorance in economics. 2499-2511 - Jon Robson:
A social epistemology of aesthetics: belief polarization, echo chambers and aesthetic judgement. 2513-2528 - Tim Kenyon:
False polarization: debiasing as applied social epistemology. 2529-2547 - Bert Baumgaertner:
Yes, no, maybe so: a veritistic approach to echo chambers using a trichotomous belief model. 2549-2569
Volume 191, Number 12, August 2014
- Karl Schafer:
Doxastic planning and epistemic internalism. 2571-2591 - Arnon Keren:
Trust and belief: a preemptive reasons account. 2593-2615 - Tim Kraft:
Transmission arguments against knowledge closure are still fallacious. 2617-2632 - Andrea Iacona:
Ockhamism without Thin Red Lines. 2633-2652 - Predrag Sustar, Zdenka Brzovic:
The function debate: between "cheap tricks" and evolutionary neutrality. 2653-2671 - Erich Kummerfeld, David Danks:
Model change and reliability in scientific inference. 2673-2693 - David Barrett:
Functional analysis and mechanistic explanation. 2695-2714 - Ralf-Thomas Klein:
Where there are internal defeaters, there are "confirmers". 2715-2728 - Ellen Fridland:
They've lost control: reflections on skill. 2729-2750 - Kristen Intemann, Inmaculada de Melo-Martín:
Are there limits to scientists' obligations to seek and engage dissenters? 2751-2765 - Brian Besong:
Moral intuitionism and disagreement. 2767-2789 - Bredo C. Johnsen:
Hume, Goodman and radical inductive skepticism. 2791-2813 - Iris Loeb:
Uniting model theory and the universalist tradition of logic: Carnap's early axiomatics. 2815-2833 - Nicholas Tebben:
Deontology and doxastic control. 2835-2847 - Joshua May:
On the very concept of free will. 2849-2866 - Sam Baron, Kristie Miller:
Causation in a timeless world. 2867-2886
Volume 191, Number 13, September 2014
- Otávio A. S. Bueno, Peter Vickers:
Is science inconsistent? 2887-2889 - Peter Vickers:
Theory flexibility and inconsistency in science. 2891-2906 - Karin Verelst:
Newton versus Leibniz: intransparency versus inconsistency. 2907-2940 - Juha Saatsi:
Inconsistency and scientific realism. 2941-2955 - Christopher Pincock:
How to avoid inconsistent idealizations. 2957-2972 - Robert W. Batterman:
The inconsistency of Physics (with a capital "P"). 2973-2992 - Jody Azzouni:
A new characterization of scientific theories. 2993-3008 - Kevin J. Davey:
Can good science be logically inconsistent? 3009-3026 - Mathias Frisch:
Models and scientific representations or: who is afraid of inconsistency? 3027-3040 - Newton C. A. da Costa, Décio Krause:
Physics, inconsistency, and quasi-truth. 3041-3055 - Richard D. Benham, Chris Mortensen, Graham Priest:
Chunk and permeate III: the Dirac delta function. 3057-3062 - Jean Paul Van Bendegem:
Inconsistency in mathematics and the mathematics of inconsistency. 3063-3078 - M. Bryson Brown:
The shape of science. 3079-3109 - Dunja Seselja, Christian Straßer:
Epistemic justification in the context of pursuit: a coherentist approach. 3111-3141 - James W. McAllister:
Methodological dilemmas and emotion in science. 3143-3158
Volume 191, Number 14, September 2014
- Daniel Jeremy Singer:
Sleeping beauty should be imprecise. 3159-3172 - Hao Tang:
Wittgenstein and the Dualism of the Inner and the Outer. 3173-3194 - Sebastian Lutz:
Generalizing empirical adequacy I: multiplicity and approximation. 3195-3225 - Timothy Perrine:
In defense of non-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony. 3227-3237 - Paul Dimmock, Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes:
Knowledge, conservatism, and pragmatics. 3239-3269 - Daniel J. Hicks:
A new direction for science and values. 3271-3295 - Katherine Puddifoot:
A defence of epistemic responsibility: why laziness and ignorance are bad after all. 3297-3309 - Chris Tucker:
On what inferentially justifies what: the vices of reliabilism and proper functionalism. 3311-3328 - Elmar Geir Unnsteinsson:
Compositionality and sandbag semantics. 3329-3350 - Audrey Yap:
Idealization, epistemic logic, and epistemology. 3351-3366 - Daniel A. Wilkenfeld:
Functional explaining: a new approach to the philosophy of explanation. 3367-3391 - Jeroen Smid:
Tarski's one and only concept of truth. 3393-3406 - Jeffrey Kane, Pavel Naumov:
The Ryōan-ji axiom for common knowledge on hypergraphs. 3407-3426 - Phil Corkum:
Presentism, truthmakers and distributional properties. 3427-3446 - Bruce Raymond Long:
Information is intrinsically semantic but alethically neutral. 3447-3467 - Erich Kummerfeld, David Danks:
Erratum to: Model change and methodological virtues in scientific inference. 3469-3472
Volume 191, Number 15, October 2014
- Elia Zardini:
Context and consequence. An intercontextual substructural logic. 3473-3500 - Nathan L. King:
Perseverance as an intellectual virtue. 3501-3523 - Alexander R. Pruss:
Regular probability comparisons imply the Banach-Tarski Paradox. 3525-3540 - Alexander Dinges:
Epistemic contextualism can be stated properly. 3541-3556 - Ken Akiba:
A defense of indeterminate distinctness. 3557-3573 - Russell Marcus:
The holistic presumptions of the indispensability argument. 3575-3594 - Anouk Barberousse, Marion Vorms:
About the warrants of computer-based empirical knowledge. 3595-3620 - Trevor Hedberg:
Epistemic supererogation and its implications. 3621-3637 - Jan Degenaar, Erik Myin:
Representation-hunger reconsidered. 3639-3648 - Alexander Skiles:
Is there a dilemma for the truthmaker non-maximalist? 3649-3659 - Michael Schippers:
Coherence, striking agreement, and reliability - On a putative vindication of the Shogenji measure. 3661-3684 - Cynthia Macdonald:
In my 'Mind's Eye': introspectionism, detectivism, and the basis of authoritative self-knowledge. 3685-3710 - Steven P. James:
Hallucinating real things. 3711-3732 - Mathieu Beirlaen, Atocha Aliseda-Llera:
A conditional logic for abduction. 3733-3758 - Christopher B. Kulp:
The pre-theoreticality of moral intuitions. 3759-3778 - Nathan L. King:
Erratum to: Perseverance as an intellectual virtue. 3779-3801
Volume 191, Number 16, November 2014
- Miren Boehm:
Hume's definitions of 'Cause': Without idealizations, within the bounds of science. 3803-3819 - Michael Schippers:
Probabilistic measures of coherence: from adequacy constraints towards pluralism. 3821-3845 - David Palmer:
Deterministic Frankfurt cases. 3847-3864 - Brian Talbot:
Why so negative? Evidence aggregation and armchair philosophy. 3865-3896 - Simon Friederich, Robert V. Harlander, Koray Karaca:
Philosophical perspectives on ad hoc hypotheses and the Higgs mechanism. 3897-3917 - Justin T. Tiehen:
A psychofunctionalist argument against nonconceptualism. 3919-3934 - Mathieu Doucet, John Turri:
Non-psychological weakness of will: self-control, stereotypes, and consequences. 3935-3954 - Ilho Park:
Confirmation measures and collaborative belief updating. 3955-3975 - Marcello Di Bello:
Epistemic closure, assumptions and topics of inquiry. 3977-4002 - Christopher Cowie:
In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity. 4003-4017 - H. Orri Stefánsson:
Desires, beliefs and conditional desirability. 4019-4035
Volume 191, Number 17, November 2014
- Tommaso Bertolotti, Lorenzo Magnani:
An epistemological analysis of gossip and gossip-based knowledge. 4037-4067 - Maribel Anacona, Luis Carlos Arboleda, Francisco Javier Pérez-Fernández:
On Bourbaki's axiomatic system for set theory. 4069-4098 - Peter Dennis:
Criteria for indefeasible knowledge: John Mcdowell and 'epistemological disjunctivism'. 4099-4113 - Mark McEvoy:
Causal tracking reliabilism and the Gettier problem. 4115-4130 - Ryan Dawson:
Wittgenstein on pure and applied mathematics. 4131-4148 - Letitia Meynell:
Imagination and insight: a new acount of the content of thought experiments. 4149-4168 - Ryan Smith:
Explanation, understanding, and control. 4169-4200 - Markus Pantsar:
An empirically feasible approach to the epistemology of arithmetic. 4201-4229 - Denis Buehler:
Incomplete understanding of complex numbers Girolamo Cardano: a case study in the acquisition of mathematical concepts. 4231-4252
Volume 191, Number 18, December 2014
- William Boos:
Reflective inquiry and "The Fate of Reason". 4253-4314 - Arif Ahmed, Adam Caulton:
Causal Decision Theory and EPR correlations. 4315-4352 - Brian Kim:
The locality and globality of instrumental rationality: the normative significance of preference reversals. 4353-4376 - Gabriel Catren, Julien Page:
On the notions of indiscernibility and indeterminacy in the light of the Galois-Grothendieck theory. 4377-4408 - Ryan Muldoon, Chiara Lisciandra, Stephan Hartmann:
Why are there descriptive norms? Because we looked for them. 4409-4429 - Delia Belleri:
You can say what you think: vindicating the effability of our thoughts. 4431-4450 - Thomas N. P. A. Brouwer:
A paradox of rejection. 4451-4464
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.
last updated on 2025-12-09 00:13 CET by the dblp team
all metadata released as open data under CC0 1.0 license
see also: Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Imprint
dblp was originally created in 1993 at:
since 2018, dblp has been operated and maintained by:
the dblp computer science bibliography is funded and supported by:
