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Synthese, Volume 196
Volume 196, Number 1, January 2019
- Thomas Müller, Antje Rumberg, Verena Wagner:
An introduction to real possibilities, indeterminism, and free will: three contingencies of the debate. 1-10 - Tomasz Placek:
Laplace's demon tries on Aristotle's cloak: on two approaches to determinism. 11-30 - Jan M. Broersen:
Agents necessitating effects in newtonian time and space: from power and opportunity to effectivity. 31-68 - Peter Øhrstrøm:
A critical discussion of Prior's philosophical and tense-logical analysis of the ideas of indeterminism and human freedom. 69-85 - Ishtiyaque Haji:
A paradox concerning Frankfurt examples. 87-103 - Erasmus Mayr:
Alternative possibilities and asymmetry. 105-125 - Laura Waddell Ekstrom:
Toward a plausible event-causal indeterminist account of free will. 127-144 - Robert Kane:
The complex tapestry of free will: striving will, indeterminism and volitional streams. 145-160 - Niels van Miltenburg, Dawa Ometto:
The libertarian predicament: a plea for action theory. 161-178 - Ruth Groff:
Sublating the free will problematic: powers, agency and causal determination. 179-200 - Barbara Vetter:
Are abilities dispositions? 201-220
- Martin L. Jönsson, Tomoji Shogenji:
A unified account of the conjunction fallacy by coherence. 221-237 - Ari Maunu:
The principle of the indiscernibility of identicals requires no restrictions. 239-246 - Manuel Barrantes:
Optimal representations and the Enhanced Indispensability Argument. 247-263 - Daniele Mundici:
De Finetti coherence and the product law for independent events. 265-271 - Mathieu Vidal, Denis Perrin:
A default-free solution to the imperfective paradox. 273-297 - Shan Gao:
The measurement problem revisited. 299-311 - Neil Levy:
Due deference to denialism: explaining ordinary people's rejection of established scientific findings. 313-327 - Lorenzo Azzano:
The question of realism for powers. 329-354 - Sara Weaver:
The harms of ignoring the social nature of science. 355-375 - Selene Arfini, Tommaso Bertolotti, Lorenzo Magnani:
Online communities as virtual cognitive niches. 377-397 - Benjamin Eva:
A-symmetric confirmation and anthropic skepticism. 399-412 - Justin P. Bruner:
Minority (dis)advantage in population games. 413-427 - John Thrasher:
Constructivism, representation, and stability: path-dependence in public reason theories of justice. 429-450
Volume 196, Number 2, February 2019
- Darrell P. Rowbottom:
Scientific realism: what it is, the contemporary debate, and new directions. 451-484 - Johanna Wolff:
Naturalistic quietism or scientific realism? 485-498 - Bence Nanay:
Entity realism and singularist semirealism. 499-517 - Catherine Z. Elgin:
Nominalism, realism and objectivity. 519-534 - Greg Frost-Arnold:
Should a historically motivated anti-realist be a Stanfordite? 535-551 - K. Brad Wray:
Discarded theories: the role of changing interests. 553-569 - Peter Vickers:
Towards a realistic success-to-truth inference for scientific realism. 571-585 - Jamin Asay:
Going local: a defense of methodological localism about scientific realism. 587-609 - Juha Saatsi:
What is theoretical progress of science? 611-631
- Claudia Picazo Jaque:
Are mental representations underdeterminacy-free? 633-654 - Julie Zahle, Harold Kincaid:
Why be a methodological individualist? 655-675 - Murat Aydede:
Is the experience of pain transparent? - Introspecting phenomenal qualities. 677-708 - Jonathan Reid Surovell:
Stance empiricism and epistemic reason. 709-733 - Daniel Bonevac:
Free choice reasons. 735-760
Volume 196, Number 3, March 2019
- Karim Bschir, Simon Lohse, Hasok Chang:
Introduction: systematicity, the nature of science? 761-773 - C. Mantzavinos:
The nature of science. A dialogue. 775-793 - Sara Green:
Science and common sense: perspectives from philosophy and science education. 795-818 - K. Brad Wray:
Systematicity and the Continuity Thesis. 819-832 - Timothy Daniel Lyons:
Systematicity theory meets Socratic scientific realism: the systematic quest for truth. 833-861 - Alexander Bird:
Systematicity, knowledge, and bias. How systematicity made clinical medicine a science. 863-879 - Naomi Oreskes:
Systematicity is necessary but not sufficient: on the problem of facsimile science. 881-905 - Paul Hoyningen-Huene:
Replies. 907-928 - Matthias Schirn:
Frege's philosophy of geometry. 929-971 - Alexei Grinbaum:
The effectiveness of mathematics in physics of the unknown. 973-989 - Santiago Ginnobili, Daniel Blanco:
Wallace's and Darwin's natural selection theories. 991-1017 - Geoff Georgi:
Propositions, representation, and truth. 1019-1043 - Kentaro Fujimoto:
Deflationism beyond arithmetic. 1045-1069 - Zach Barnett:
Tolerance and the distributed sorites. 1071-1077 - Olav B. Vassend:
Confirmation and the ordinal equivalence thesis. 1079-1095 - Marko Tesic:
Confirmation and the generalized Nagel-Schaffner model of reduction: a Bayesian analysis. 1097-1129 - Laurenz Hudetz:
The semantic view of theories and higher-order languages. 1131-1149 - Casey Rebecca Johnson:
Investigating illocutionary monism. 1151-1165 - Jaakko Hirvelä:
Global safety: how to deal with necessary truths. 1167-1186 - Matthew C. Haug:
No microphysical causation? No problem: selective causal skepticism and the structure of completeness-based arguments for physicalism. 1187-1208
Volume 196, Number 4, April 2019
- Manuel García-Carpintero, Bjørn Jespersen:
Introduction: primitivism versus reductionism about the problem of the unity of the proposition. 1209-1224 - Matti Eklund:
Regress, unity, facts, and propositions. 1225-1247 - Marie Duzí:
If structured propositions are logical procedures then how are procedures individuated? 1249-1283 - Bjørn Jespersen:
Anatomy of a proposition. 1285-1324 - Richard Gaskin:
From the unity of the proposition to linguistic idealism. 1325-1342 - Jeffrey C. King:
On propositions and fineness of grain (again!). 1343-1367 - Scott Soames:
Propositions as Cognitive Acts. 1369-1383 - Peter W. Hanks:
On cancellation. 1385-1402 - François Récanati:
Force cancellation. 1403-1424 - Bryan Pickel:
Unity through truth. 1425-1452 - Jeff Speaks:
Act theories and the attitudes. 1453-1473 - Gary Ostertag:
Structured propositions and the logical form of predication. 1475-1499 - Peter Pagin:
A general argument against structured propositions. 1501-1528 - Lorraine Juliano Keller:
What propositional structure could not be. 1529-1553
- Julia Zakkou:
Denial and retraction: a challenge for theories of taste predicates. 1555-1573 - Lindsay Crawford:
Believing the best: on doxastic partiality in friendship. 1575-1593 - Michael Bennett McNulty:
Continuity of change in Kant's dynamics. 1595-1622 - Clinton Castro, Casey Hart:
The imprecise impermissivist's dilemma. 1623-1640 - Charles Côté-Bouchard:
'Ought' implies 'can' against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism. 1641-1656
Volume 196, Number 5, May 2019
- Samuel C. Fletcher, Patricia Palacios, Laura Ruetsche, Elay Shech:
Infinite idealizations in science: an introduction. 1657-1669 - Ryan M. Nefdt:
Infinity and the foundations of linguistics. 1671-1711 - Michael Strevens:
The structure of asymptotic idealization. 1713-1731 - Silvia De Bianchi:
Combining finite and infinite elements: Why do we use infinite idealizations in engineering? 1733-1748 - Samuel C. Fletcher:
Minimal approximations and Norton's dome. 1749-1760 - Giovanni Valente:
On the paradox of reversible processes in thermodynamics. 1761-1781 - Katie Robertson:
Stars and steam engines: To what extent do thermodynamics and statistical mechanics apply to self-gravitating systems? 1783-1808 - Andrew Wayne:
Point-particle explanations: the case of gravitational waves. 1809-1829 - Benjamin H. Feintzeig:
Deduction and definability in infinite statistical systems. 1831-1861 - Pauline van Wierst:
The paradox of phase transitions in the light of constructive mathematics. 1863-1884 - Chuang Liu:
Infinite idealization and contextual realism. 1885-1918 - Sorin Ioan Bangu:
Discontinuities and singularities, data and phenomena: for Referentialism. 1919-1937 - Sam Baron:
Infinite lies and explanatory ties: idealization in phase transitions. 1939-1961 - Elay Shech:
Infinitesimal idealization, easy road nominalism, and fractional quantum statistics. 1963-1990 - John Earman:
The role of idealizations in the Aharonov-Bohm effect. 1991-2019
- N. Ángel Pinillos:
Knowledge and the permissibility of action. 2021-2043 - Pawel Jakub Zieba:
Naïve realism about unconscious perception. 2045-2073 - Brent J. C. Madison:
Is open-mindedness truth-conducive? 2075-2087 - Leonid Tarasov:
Semantic relativism and ways of knowing. 2089-2109
Volume 196, Number 6, June 2019
- Serife Tekin, Edouard Machery:
Beyond mind-body dualism: embracing pluralism in psychiatric research - introduction to the special issue, "Psychiatry and Its Philosophy". 2111-2115 - Maël Lemoine:
On the neurobiological redefinition of psychiatric symptoms: elimination, reduction, or what? 2117-2133 - Sarah K. Robins:
Confabulation and constructive memory. 2135-2151 - Catherine Stinson:
The absent body in psychiatric diagnosis, treatment, and research. 2153-2176 - Kathryn Tabb:
Philosophy of psychiatry after diagnostic kinds. 2177-2195 - Serife Tekin:
The missing self in scientific psychiatry. 2197-2215 - Ginger A. Hoffman:
Collectively ill: a preliminary case that groups can have psychiatric disorders. 2217-2241
- M R. X. Dentith:
Conspiracy theories on the basis of the evidence. 2243-2261 - Luis Rosa:
Reasoning without regress. 2263-2278 - Don Fallis, Peter J. Lewis:
Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling. 2279-2303 - Brandon Boesch:
The means-end account of scientific, representational actions. 2305-2322 - Naftali Weinberger:
Mechanisms without mechanistic explanation. 2323-2340 - Markus I. Eronen:
Robust realism for the life sciences. 2341-2354 - Arnon Cahen:
Nonconceptual apprehension and the reason-giving character of perception. 2355-2383 - Samantha Copeland:
On serendipity in science: discovery at the intersection of chance and wisdom. 2385-2406 - Benjamin C. Jantzen:
Kinds of process and the levels of selection. 2407-2433 - Mahrad Almotahari:
Semantic deflationism deflated. 2435-2454 - Anubav Vasudevan:
Biased information and the exchange paradox. 2455-2485 - Kevin Scharp:
On the indeterminacy of the meter. 2487-2517 - Jonathan Reid Surovell:
Empirical significance, predictive power, and explication. 2519-2539 - Bruno Whittle:
Correction to: Self-referential propositions. 2541 - Hans van Ditmarsch:
Correction to: Dynamics of lying. 2543
Volume 196, Number 7, July 2019
- Arnold Koslow:
The modality and non-extensionality of the quantifiers. 2545-2554 - Roy T. Cook:
Possible predicates and actual properties. 2555-2582 - Catarina Dutilh Novaes:
Axiomatizations of arithmetic and the first-order/second-order divide. 2583-2597 - Jody Azzouni:
The challenge of many logics: a new approach to evaluating the role of ideology in Quinean commitment. 2599-2619 - Alexander C. Paseau:
A measure of inferential-role preservation. 2621-2642 - Bob Hale:
Second-order logic: properties, semantics, and existential commitments. 2643-2669 - Liron Cohen, Arnon Avron:
The middle ground-ancestral logic. 2671-2693
- Christos Kyriacou:
Evolutionary debunking: the Milvian Bridge destabilized. 2695-2713 - Brendan Larvor:
From Euclidean geometry to knots and nets. 2715-2736 - Richard Pettigrew:
Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree. 2737-2776 - James Norton, Kristie Miller:
A psychologistic theory of metaphysical explanation. 2777-2802