Synthese, Volume 197

Volume 197, Number 1, January 2020

Special Issue on New perspectives in Metaontology

• 
  Carlo Rossi, Kyle Mitchell:
  New perspectives in metaontology: introduction to the special issue. 1-5
• 
  Peter van Inwagen:
  The neo-Carnapians. 7-32
• 
  Tim Button:
  Deflationary metaphysics and ordinary language. 33-57
• 
  Stephen Biggs, Jessica Wilson:
  Abductive two-dimensionalism: a new route to the a priori identification of necessary truths. 59-93
• 
  Benjamin Schnieder:
  Grounding and dependence. 95-124

Regular articles

• 
  Christoph Kelp, Mona Simion:
  The C account of assertion: a negative result. 125-137
• 
  Sergi Oms:
  Minimalism, supervaluations and fixed points. 139-153
• 
  Philipp Berghofer:
  Towards a phenomenological conception of experiential justification. 155-183
• 
  Megan Henricks Stotts:
  Toward a sharp semantics/pragmatics distinction. 185-208
• 
  Dominik Klein, Johannes Marx, Simon Scheller:
  Rationality in context. 209-232
• 
  Line Edslev Andersen:
  Acceptable gaps in mathematical proofs. 233-247
• 
  Anneli Jefferson:
  What does it take to be a brain disorder? 249-262
• 
  James Read, Thomas Møller-Nielsen:
  Motivating dualities. 263-291
• 
  Liqian Zhou:
  Complementarity in information studies. 293-310
• 
  Friederike Moltmann:
  Existence predicates. 311-335
• 
  Michael Dietrich, Phillip Honenberger:
  Duhem's problem revisited: logical versus epistemic formulations and solutions. 337-354
• 
  Andrew Parisi:
  Atomic ontology. 355-379
• 
  Yafeng Shan:
  Kuhn's "wrong turning" and legacy today. 381-406
• 
  Justin P. Bruner:
  Bargaining and the dynamics of divisional norms. 407-425
• 
  Michael Klenk:
  Third factor explanations and disagreement in metaethics. 427-446
• 
  Ilkka Niiniluoto:
  Social aspects of scientific knowledge. 447-468

Volume 197, Number 2, February 2020

Special Issue on Foundations of Mathematics

• 
  Carolin Antos, Neil Barton, Sy-David Friedman, Claudio Ternullo, John Wigglesworth:
  Introduction. 469-475
• 
  Jared Warren, Daniel Waxman:
  A metasemantic challenge for mathematical determinacy. 477-495
• 
  Sam Sanders:
  Reverse formalism 16. 497-544
• 
  Chris Scambler:
  An indeterminate universe of sets. 545-573
• 
  Zeynep Soysal:
  Why is the universe of sets not a set? 575-597
• 
  Shivaram Lingamneni:
  Can we resolve the continuum hypothesis? 599-622
• 
  Neil Barton, Sy-David Friedman:
  Maximality and ontology: how axiom content varies across philosophical frameworks. 623-649
• 
  Dimitris Tsementzis:
  A meaning explanation for HoTT. 651-680
• 
  David Corfield:
  Expressing 'the structure of' in homotopy type theory. 681-700

Regular Articles

• 
  David Corfield:
  Correction to: Expressing 'the structure of' in homotopy type theory. 701
• 
  Richard Johns:
  Epistemic theories of objective chance. 703-730
• 
  Andrea Oldofredi:
  Stochasticity and Bell-type quantum field theory. 731-750
• 
  Kristie Miller, Alex O. Holcombe, Andrew James Latham:
  Temporal phenomenology: phenomenological illusion versus cognitive error. 751-771
• 
  Federico Matias Pailos:
  Validity, dialetheism and self-reference. 773-792
• 
  Gregory Antill:
  Epistemic freedom revisited. 793-815
• 
  Jacob Barrett:
  Is Maximin egalitarian? 817-837
• 
  Hun Chung, Brian Kogelmann:
  Diversity and rights: a social choice-theoretic analysis of the possibility of public reason. 839-865
• 
  Isaac Wilhelm:
  A statistical analysis of luck. 867-885
• 
  Ming Hsiung:
  What paradoxes depend on. 887-913

Volume 197, Number 3, March 2020

Special Issue on Philosophical Methods

• 
  Anna-Maria A. Eder, Insa Lawler, Raphael van Riel:
  Philosophical methods under scrutiny: introduction to the special issue philosophical methods. 915-923
• 
  Georg Brun:
  Conceptual re-engineering: from explication to reflective equilibrium. 925-954
• 
  Mark Pinder:
  On Strawson's critique of explication as a method in philosophy. 955-981
• 
  Moritz Cordes:
  The constituents of an explication. 983-1010
• 
  Catarina Dutilh Novaes:
  Carnapian explication and ameliorative analysis: a systematic comparison. 1011-1034
• 
  Eve Kitsik:
  Explication as a strategy for revisionary philosophy. 1035-1056
• 
  Martin Kusch, Robin McKenna:
  The genealogical method in epistemology. 1057-1076
• 
  Miguel Egler, Lewis D. Ross:
  Philosophical expertise under the microscope. 1077-1098
• 
  Sebastian Lutz:
  Armchair philosophy naturalized. 1099-1125
• 
  Daniele Sgaravatti:
  Experience and reasoning: challenging the a priori/a posteriori distinction. 1127-1148
• 
  Samuel Z. Elgin:
  On question-begging and analytic content. 1149-1163
• 
  Alex Steinberg:
  Pleonastic propositions and the face value theory. 1165-1180
• 
  Mark Balaguer:
  Why metaphysical debates are not merely verbal (or how to have a non-verbal metaphysical debate). 1181-1201

Regular Articles

• 
  Emmanuel J. Genot, Justine Jacot:
  The brain attics: the strategic role of memory in single and multi-agent inquiry. 1203-1224
• 
  Neil Campbell:
  Self-forming actions, contrastive explanations, and the structure of the will. 1225-1240
• 
  Stefan Buijsman:
  Two roads to the successor axiom. 1241-1261
• 
  André Sant'Anna:
  The hybrid contents of memory. 1263-1290
• 
  Jacob Berger:
  Implicit attitudes and awareness. 1291-1312
• 
  Konrad Werner:
  Enactment and construction of the cognitive niche: toward an ontology of the mind-world connection. 1313-1341
• 
  Randall G. McCutcheon:
  Regression to the mean and Judy Benjamin. 1343-1355
• 
  Tobias Hansson Wahlberg:
  Causal powers and social ontology. 1357-1377
• 
  Namjoong Kim:
  Correction to: Bad company objection to Joongol Kim's adverbial theory of numbers. 1379

Volume 197, Number 4, April 2020

Special Issue on Logical Perspectives on Science and Cognition - The Philosophy of Gerhard Schurz (first 14 articles),

• 
  Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Alexander Gebharter, Peter Brössel, Markus Werning:
  Introduction to the special issue "Logical perspectives on science and cognition". 1381-1390
• 
  Wolfgang Spohn:
  Defeasible normative reasoning. 1391-1428
• 
  Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Shira Elqayam:
  How and why we reason from is to ought. 1429-1446
• 
  Ioannis Votsis:
  Theory-ladenness: testing the 'untestable'. 1447-1465
• 
  Alexander Gebharter, Nina Retzlaff:
  A new proposal how to handle counterexamples to Markov causation à la Cartwright, or: fixing the chemical factory. 1467-1486
• 
  Andreas Hüttemann:
  Processes, pre-emption and further problems. 1487-1509
• 
  Ulrike Hahn, Jens Ulrik Hansen, Erik J. Olsson:
  Truth tracking performance of social networks: how connectivity and clustering can make groups less competent. 1511-1541
• 
  Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla:
  An optimality-argument for equal weighting. 1543-1563
• 
  Igor Douven:
  Scoring in context. 1565-1580
• 
  Ilkka Niiniluoto:
  Truthlikeness: old and new debates. 1581-1599
• 
  Theo A. F. Kuipers:
  Refined nomic truth approximation by revising models and postulates. 1601-1625
• 
  Gustavo Cevolani, Roberto Festa:
  A partial consequence account of truthlikeness. 1627-1646
• 
  Elke Brendel:
  Truthmaker maximalism and the truthmaker paradox. 1647-1660
• 
  Gerhard Schurz:
  Twelve great papers: comments and replies. Response to a special issue on logical perspectives on science and cognition - The philosophy of Gerhard Schurz. 1661-1695
• 
  Rohan Sud:
  Plurivaluationism, supersententialism and the problem of the many languages. 1697-1723
• 
  Travis LaCroix:
  On salience and signaling in sender-receiver games: partial pooling, learning, and focal points. 1725-1747
• 
  Daniel Williams:
  Predictive coding and thought. 1749-1775
• 
  Kevin Reuter, Justin Sytsma:
  Unfelt pain. 1777-1801
• 
  Srecko Kovac:
  On causality as the fundamental concept of Gödel's philosophy. 1803-1838
• 
  David Hommen:
  Correction to: Ontological commitments of frame-based knowledge representations. 1839-1840

Volume 197, Number 5, May 2020

Special Issue on New Trends in the Metaphysics of Science

• 
  Max Kistler:
  Introduction: new trends in the metaphysics of science. 1841-1846
• 
  Alexandre Guay, Thomas Pradeu:
  Right out of the box: how to situate metaphysics of science in relation to other metaphysical approaches. 1847-1866
• 
  Amanda Bryant:
  Keep the chickens cooped: the epistemic inadequacy of free range metaphysics. 1867-1887
• 
  Michael Esfeld:
  A proposal for a minimalist ontology. 1889-1905
• 
  James F. Woodward:
  Physical modality, laws, and counterfactuals. 1907-1929
• 
  Manolo Martínez:
  Synergic kinds. 1931-1946
• 
  Muhammad Ali Khalidi:
  Neural correlates without reduction: the case of the critical period. 1947-1959
• 
  Joshua Norton:
  Incubating a future metaphysics: quantum gravity. 1961-1982

Regular Articles

• 
  Georgie Statham:
  Normative commitments, causal structure, and policy disagreement. 1983-2003
• 
  Matthieu Queloz:
  How genealogies can affect the space of reasons. 2005-2027
• 
  Thomas Schindler:
  A note on Horwich's notion of grounding. 2029-2038
• 
  James Openshaw:
  Self-ascription and the de se. 2039-2050
• 
  John R. Welch:
  Credence for conclusions: a brief for Jeffrey's rule. 2051-2072
• 
  Henry Taylor:
  Emotions, concepts and the indeterminacy of natural kinds. 2073-2093
• 
  Eileen S. Nutting:
  Benacerraf, Field, and the agreement of mathematicians. 2095-2110
• 
  Luca Tambolo:
  So close no matter how far: counterfactuals in history of science and the inevitability/contingency controversy. 2111-2141
• 
  Miljana Milojevic:
  Extended mind, functionalism and personal identity. 2143-2170
• 
  Guido Löhr:
  Concepts and categorization: do philosophers and psychologists theorize about different things? 2171-2191
• 
  Jacek Wawer, Alex Malpass:
  Back to the actual future. 2193-2213
• 
  Griffin Klemick:
  Sellars' metaethical quasi-realism. 2215-2243
• 
  Eleonore Neufeld:
  Can we perceive mental states? 2245-2269
• 
  Peter Schulte:
  Why mental content is not like water: reconsidering the reductive claims of teleosemantics. 2271-2290

Volume 197, Number 6, June 2020

Special Issue on Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Eastern and Western Perspectives

• 
  J. Adam Carter, Chienkuo Mi, S. Orestis Palermos, Duncan Pritchard:
  Introduction to special issue: knowledge, virtue and action - eastern and western perspectives. 2291-2294
• 
  Chienkuo Mi, Shane Ryan:
  Skilful reflection as a master virtue. 2295-2308
• 
  Rie Iizuka:
  Situationism, virtue epistemology, and self-determination theory. 2309-2332
• 
  Christina Chuang:
  Rational devotion and human perfection. 2333-2355
• 
  Ju Wang:
  Scepticism, closure and rationally grounded knowledge: a new solution. 2357-2374

Regular Articles

• 
  Miloud Belkoniene:
  What should we believe about the future? 2375-2386
• 
  Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen:
  Does luck exclude knowledge or certainty? 2387-2397
• 
  Laura Caponetto:
  Undoing things with words. 2399-2414
• 
  Renée Jorgensen Bolinger:
  The rational impermissibility of accepting (some) racial generalizations. 2415-2431
• 
  Nat Hansen:
  "Nobody would really talk that way!": the critical project in contemporary ordinary language philosophy. 2433-2464
• 
  Paul Silva:
  A Bayesian explanation of the irrationality of sexist and racist beliefs involving generic content. 2465-2487
• 
  Pendaran Roberts:
  Another look at color primitivism. 2489-2506
• 
  Daniele Chiffi, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen:
  Abductive inference within a pragmatic framework. 2507-2523
• 
  Siegfried Jaag, Christian Loew:
  Making best systems best for us. 2525-2550
• 
  Vojislav Bozickovic:
  Anti-individualism and transparency. 2551-2564
• 
  Daniel A. Wilkenfeld, Tania Lombrozo:
  Explanation classification depends on understanding: extending the epistemic side-effect effect. 2565-2592
• 
  Kevin Morris:
  Multiple realization and compositional variation. 2593-2611
• 
  Xingming Hu:
  The epistemic account of faultless disagreement. 2613-2630
• 
  Matt Lutz:
  Background beliefs and plausibility thresholds: defending explanationist evidentialism. 2631-2647
• 
  Blake Roeber:
  How to argue for pragmatic encroachment. 2649-2664
• 
  Yoichi Ishida:
  In dialectical tension: realist and instrumentalist attitudes in scientific practice. 2665-2694
• 
  Blazej Skrzypulec:
  Transitivity of visual sameness. 2695-2719
• 
  Justin Donhauser:
  Informative ecological models without ecological forces. 2721-2743

Volume 197, Number 7, July 2020

Special Issue on Epistemic Dependence (first 11 articles)

• 
  Fernando Broncano-Berrocal, Jesús Vega-Encabo:
  A taxonomy of types of epistemic dependence: introduction to the Synthese special issue on epistemic dependence. 2745-2763
• 
  Benjamin McMyler:
  On not making up one's own mind. 2765-2781
• 
  Sanford C. Goldberg:
  Epistemically engineered environments. 2783-2802
• 
  C. Thi Nguyen:
  Cognitive islands and runaway echo chambers: problems for epistemic dependence on experts. 2803-2821
• 
  Bjørn G. Hallsson, Klemens Kappel:
  Disagreement and the division of epistemic labor. 2823-2847
• 
  Mona Simion, Christoph Kelp:
  How to be an anti-reductionist. 2849-2866
• 
  John Greco:
  The transmission of knowledge and garbage. 2867-2878
• 
  Duncan Pritchard:
  Anti-risk epistemology and negative epistemic dependence. 2879-2894
• 
  Fernando Broncano-Berrocal:
  Epistemic dependence and cognitive ability. 2895-2912
• 
  Walker Page:
  Defending virtue epistemology: epistemic dependence in testimony and extended cognition. 2913-2936
• 
  J. Adam Carter:
  Intellectual autonomy, epistemic dependence and cognitive enhancement. 2937-2961

Regular Articles

• 
  Emanuel Viebahn:
  Presentism, eternalism and where things are located. 2963-2974
• 
  Carlos Mariscal, W. Ford Doolittle:
  Life and life only: a radical alternative to life definitionism. 2975-2989
• 
  Bryan Pickel:
  Structured propositions and trivial composition. 2991-3006
• 
  Jon Pérez Laraudogoitia:
  Some surprising instabilities in idealized dynamical systems. 3007-3026
• 
  Doreen Fraser:
  The development of renormalization group methods for particle physics: Formal analogies between classical statistical mechanics and quantum field theory. 3027-3063
• 
  Byron Simmons:
  Impure concepts and non-qualitative properties. 3065-3086
• 
  Jonathan Mitchell:
  On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience. 3087-3111
• 
  Hannes Leitgeb:
  Why pure mathematical truths are metaphysically necessary: a set-theoretic explanation. 3113-3120
• 
  Sebastian De Haro, Henk W. De Regt:
  A precipice below which lies absurdity? Theories without a spacetime and scientific understanding. 3121-3149
• 
  Massimiliano Carrara, Ciro De Florio:
  Identity criteria: an epistemic path to conceptual grounding. 3151-3169
• 
  Timothy Perrine:
  Strong internalism, doxastic involuntarism, and the costs of compatibilism. 3171-3191

Volume 197, Number 8, August 2020

Mini-symposium on Kant and Cognition

• 
  Eric Watkins, Marcus Willaschek, Clinton Tolley:
  Mini-symposium on Kant and cognition. 3193-3194
• 
  Marcus Willaschek, Eric Watkins:
  Kant on cognition and knowledge. 3195-3213
• 
  Clinton Tolley:
  Kant on the place of cognition in the progression of our representations. 3215-3244

Regular Articles

• 
  Simon Langford:
  Knowledge judgements and cognitive psychology. 3245-3259
• 
  Haicheng Zhao:
  Knowledge without safety. 3261-3278
• 
  Alexander Greenberg:
  Should I believe all the truths? 3279-3303
• 
  David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg:
  "Till at last there remain nothing". 3305-3323
• 
  Michael Ridge:
  Normative certitude for expressivists. 3325-3347
• 
  Daniel Immerman:
  Williamson, closure, and KK. 3349-3373
• 
  Nicholas Unwin:
  Continuants, identity and essentialism. 3375-3394
• 
  Markos Valaris:
  Thinking by doing: Rylean regress and the metaphysics of action. 3395-3412
• 
  Noël Blas Saenz:
  An account of truthmaking. 3413-3435
• 
  Jan Constantin:
  Replacement and reasoning: a reliabilist account of epistemic defeat. 3437-3457
• 
  Davide Fassio:
  On the generality argument for the knowledge norm. 3459-3480
• 
  Ryan Samaroo:
  The principle of equivalence as a criterion of identity. 3481-3505
• 
  Joseph Vukov, Charles Lassiter:
  How to power encultured minds. 3507-3534
• 
  Mattias Skipper, Jens Christian Bjerring:
  Hyperintensional semantics: a Fregean approach. 3535-3558
• 
  Matt Duncan:
  Knowledge of things. 3559-3592
• 
  Daniel Whiting:
  Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief. 3593-3609
• 
  Jon Leefmann, Steffen Lesle:
  Knowledge from scientific expert testimony without epistemic trust. 3611-3641
• 
  Robert D. Cousins:
  Erratum to: The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox and discovery criteria in high energy physics. 3643
• 
  Mark Miller, Andy Clark:
  Correction to: Happily entangled: prediction, emotion, and the embodied mind. 3645

Volume 197, Number 9, September 2020

Special Issue on Mathematical Cognition and Enculturation

• 
  Markus Pantsar:
  Mathematical cognition and enculturation: introduction to the Synthese special issue. 3647-3655
• 
  Max Jones:
  Numerals and neural reuse. 3657-3681
• 
  Max Jones:
  Correction to: Numerals and neural reuse. 3683
• 
  Regina E. Fabry:
  The cerebral, extra-cerebral bodily, and socio-cultural dimensions of enculturated arithmetical cognition. 3685-3720
• 
  Mikkel Willum Johansen, Morten Misfeldt:
  Material representations in mathematical research practice. 3721-3741
• 
  Brendan Larvor:
  Why 'scaffolding' is the wrong metaphor: the cognitive usefulness of mathematical representations. 3743-3756
• 
  Karina Vold, Dirk Schlimm:
  Extended mathematical cognition: external representations with non-derived content. 3757-3777
• 
  Stefan Buijsman:
  How numerals support new cognitive capacities. 3779-3796
• 
  Jean-Charles Pelland:
  What's new: innovation and enculturation of arithmetical practices. 3797-3822
• 
  Neil Barton:
  Absence perception and the philosophy of zero. 3823-3850
• 
  Susan Rothstein, Suzi Lima:
  Quantity evaluations in Yudja: judgements, language and cultural practice. 3851-3873

Regular Articles

• 
  Colin Jakob Rittberg, Fenner Stanley Tanswell, Jean Paul Van Bendegem:
  Epistemic injustice in mathematics. 3875-3904
• 
  Thom van Gessel:
  Action models in inquisitive logic. 3905-3945
• 
  Elias Okon, Miguel Ángel Sebastián:
  A consciousness-based quantum objective collapse model. 3947-3967
• 
  Henry Ian Schiller:
  Phenomenal dispositions. 3969-3980
• 
  Joongol Kim:
  The adverbial theory of numbers: some clarifications. 3981-4000
• 
  Vera Matarese:
  A challenge for Super-Humeanism: the problem of immanent comparisons. 4001-4020
• 
  Rick Morris:
  Stranger in a strange land: an optimal-environments account of evolutionary mismatch. 4021-4046
• 
  Andrea Guardo:
  Meaning relativism and subjective idealism. 4047-4064
• 
  Jaakko Hirvelä:
  How to stay safe while extending the mind. 4065-4081
• 
  Oron Shagrir:
  In defense of the semantic view of computation. 4083-4108
• 
  Jan Constantin, Thomas Grundmann:
  Epistemic authority: preemption through source sensitive defeat. 4109-4130

Volume 197, Number 10, October 2020

Special Issue on The Metaphysics of Entanglement (first 8 articles), edited by George Darby

• 
  Jenann Ismael, Jonathan Schaffer:
  Quantum holism: nonseparability as common ground. 4131-4160
• 
  Tomasz Bigaj:
  On quantum entanglement, counterfactuals, causality and dispositions. 4161-4185
• 
  Elizabeth Miller:
  Two notions of holism. 4187-4206
• 
  Neil I. Dewar:
  La Bohume. 4207-4225
• 
  Alyssa Ney:
  Finding the world in the wave function: some strategies for solving the macro-object problem. 4227-4249
• 
  Alessandro Torza:
  Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy and worldly incompleteness. 4251-4264
• 
  Richard Healey:
  A pragmatist view of the metaphysics of entanglement. 4265-4302
• 
  David Wallace:
  Lessons from realistic physics for the metaphysics of quantum theory. 4303-4318
• 
  Holly Kantin:
  Why compositional nihilism dissolves puzzles. 4319-4340
• 
  Florian J. Boge:
  An argument against global no miracles arguments. 4341-4363
• 
  Yang Liu, Huw Price:
  Ramsey and Joyce on deliberation and prediction. 4365-4386
• 
  Ulrich E. Stegmann:
  Physical models and embodied cognition. 4387-4405
• 
  Sanford C. Goldberg:
  What we owe each other, epistemologically speaking: ethico-political values in social epistemology. 4407-4423
• 
  H. Orri Stefánsson:
  Is risk aversion irrational? Examining the "fallacy" of large numbers. 4425-4437
• 
  Taylor W. Cyr:
  Timelessness and freedom. 4439-4453
• 
  Peter Carruthers:
  Mechanisms for constrained stochasticity. 4455-4473
• 
  Erik J. Olsson:
  A diachronic perspective on peer disagreement in veritistic social epistemology. 4475-4493
• 
  Dominik Kauss:
  Credence as doxastic tendency. 4495-4518
• 
  Robert E. Pezet:
  Finding satisfaction in presentism. 4519-4531
• 
  Patrick Butlin:
  Representation and the active consumer. 4533-4550
• 
  Marc-Kevin Daoust:
  The explanatory role of consistency requirements. 4551-4569
• 
  Olivier Darrigol:
  Constitutive principles versus comprehensibility conditions in post-Kantian physics. 4571-4616
• 
  Daniel Vanello:
  Affect, motivational states, and evaluative concepts. 4617-4636
• 
  David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg:
  Correction to: "Till at last there remain nothing". 4637

Volume 197, Number 11, November 2020

Special Issue on The Legacy of D.K. Lewis,

• 
  Marianna Antonutti Marfori, Pierluigi Graziani:
  The Legacy of D. K. Lewis: Introduction to the Special Issue. 4639-4644
• 
  John Divers, Jade Fletcher:
  (Once again) Lewis on the analysis of modality. 4645-4668
• 
  Sonia Roca-Royes:
  Genuine Modal Realism, the Humean thesis and advanced modalizing. 4669-4690
• 
  Achille C. Varzi:
  Counterpart theories for everyone. 4691-4715
• 
  Daniel Nolan:
  It's a kind of magic: Lewis, magic and properties. 4717-4741
• 
  A. R. J. Fisher:
  Correction to: On Lewis against magic: a study of method in metaphysics. 4743
• 
  Andrea Borghini, Giorgio Lando:
  Mereological monism and Humean supervenience. 4745-4765
• 
  Claudio Calosi:
  An elegant universe. 4767-4782
• 
  Cei Maslen:
  Causation, absences, and the Prince of Wales. 4783-4794
• 
  Alan Hájek:
  Minkish dispositions. 4795-4811
• 
  Andrea C. Bottani:
  Bringing back intrinsics to enduring things. 4813-4834
• 
  Giuliano Torrengo:
  Time travel and coincidence-free local dynamical theories. 4835-4846
• 
  Vincenzo Fano, Giovanni Macchia:
  A physical interpretation of Lewis' discrepancy between personal and external time in time travels. 4847-4866
• 
  John Collins:
  Simple belief. 4867-4885
• 
  Mario Piazza, Nevia Dolcini:
  Possibilities regained: neo-Lewisian contextualism and ordinary life. 4887-4906

Regular Articles

• 
  David Henderson, Terence Horgan:
  Evidentially embedded epistemic entitlement. 4907-4926
• 
  Sylvia Pauw:
  Deducing false propositions from true ideas: Nieuwentijt on mathematical reasoning. 4927-4945
• 
  Michele Palmira:
  Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes. 4947-4973
• 
  Chris Ranalli:
  Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology. 4975-5007
• 
  Michal Masny:
  Friedman on suspended judgment. 5009-5026
• 
  Gordian Haas:
  JuDAS: a theory of rational belief revision. 5027-5050
• 
  Patrick Todd:
  The problem of future contingents: scoping out a solution. 5051-5072
• 
  Elizabeth Jackson:
  Belief, credence, and evidence. 5073-5092

Volume 197, Number 12, December 2020

Special Issue on The Epistemology of Ernest Sosa (first 18 articles), edited by Christoph Kelp

• 
  Christoph Kelp:
  The epistemology of Ernest Sosa: an introduction. 5093-5100
• 
  Sven Bernecker:
  Against global method safety. 5101-5116
• 
  J. Adam Carter:
  Sosa on knowledge, judgment and guessing. 5117-5136
• 
  Matthew Chrisman:
  Performance normativity and here-and-now doxastic agency. 5137-5145
• 
  John Greco:
  Safety in Sosa. 5147-5157
• 
  John Greco:
  Correction to: Safety in Sosa. 5159
• 
  Thomas Grundmann:
  Saving safety from counterexamples. 5161-5185
• 
  Christoph Kelp, Cameron Boult, Fernando Broncano-Berrocal, Paul Dimmock, Harmen Ghijsen, Mona Simion:
  Hoops and Barns: a new dilemma for Sosa. 5187-5202
• 
  Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas:
  The 'Conditional Position Problem' for epistemic externalism. 5203-5224
• 
  Paul Horwich:
  Sosa's theory of knowledge. 5225-5232
• 
  Jesper Kallestrup:
  Group virtue epistemology. 5233-5251
• 
  Clayton Mitchell Littlejohn:
  Truth, knowledge, and the standard of proof in criminal law. 5253-5286
• 
  Matthew McGrath:
  Sosa on epistemic value: a Kantian obstacle. 5287-5300
• 
  Kate Nolfi:
  Functional belief and judgmental belief. 5301-5317
• 
  Matthew Soteriou:
  Dreams, agency, and judgement. 5319-5334
• 
  Kurt L. Sylvan:
  Can performance epistemology explain higher epistemic value? 5335-5356
• 
  Ralph Wedgwood:
  The internalist virtue theory of knowledge. 5357-5378
• 
  José L. Zalabardo:
  Safety, sensitivity and differential support. 5379-5388

Regular Articles

• 
  Paul D. Thorn:
  The joint aggregation of beliefs and degrees of belief. 5389-5409
• 
  Thomas E. Hodgson:
  Russellians can solve the problem of empty names with nonsingular propositions. 5411-5433
• 
  Ru Ye:
  Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility. 5435-5455
• 
  Katarzyna Paprzycka-Hausman:
  Knowledge of consequences: an explanation of the epistemic side-effect effect. 5457-5490
• 
  David Rose, Jonathan Schaffer, Kevin Tobia:
  Folk teleology drives persistence judgments. 5491-5509
• 
  Robert Mirski, Arkadiusz Gut:
  Action-based versus cognitivist perspectives on socio-cognitive development: culture, language and social experience within the two paradigms. 5511-5537
• 
  Benjamin H. Feintzeig:
  Correction to: Deduction and definability in infinite statistical systems. 5539-5540