"Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction."

Christian Ewerhart (2017)

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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.07.003

access: open

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2024-10-06

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Christian Ewerhart:
Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction. Games Econ. Behav. 105: 195-211 (2017)

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