"Second-Price All-Pay Auctions and Best-Reply Matching Equilibria."

Gisèle Umbhauer (2019)

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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919400097

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2021-03-24

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  - https://dblp.org/rec/journals/igtr/Umbhauer19
Gisèle Umbhauer:
Second-Price All-Pay Auctions and Best-Reply Matching Equilibria. IGTR 21(2): 1940009:1-1940009:40 (2019)

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