"Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with ..."

Daniel Cardona, Arnold Polanski (2013)

> Home

Details and statistics

DOI: 10.1007/S00355-012-0681-3

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2023-08-06

- view
  - electronic edition via DOI
  - unpaywalled version
  authority control:
- export record
  dblp key:
  - journals/scw/CardonaP13
- ask others
- share record
  persistent URL:
  - https://dblp.org/rec/journals/scw/CardonaP13
Daniel Cardona, Arnold Polanski:
Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol. Soc. Choice Welf. 41(2): 217-240 (2013)

manage site settings

To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.