"Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized ..."

Murat R. Sertel, M. Remzi Sanver (2004)

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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-003-0218-X

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2020-07-22

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Murat R. Sertel, M. Remzi Sanver:
Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners. Soc. Choice Welf. 22(2): 331-347 (2004)

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