"Optimal Incentives to Mitigate Epidemics: A Stackelberg Mean Field Game ..."

Alexander Aurell et al. (2022)

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DOI: 10.1137/20M1377862

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type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2022-09-22

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Alexander Aurell, René Carmona, Gökçe Dayanikli, Mathieu Laurière:
Optimal Incentives to Mitigate Epidemics: A Stackelberg Mean Field Game Approach. SIAM J. Control. Optim. 60(2): S294-S322 (2022)

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