"Budget-Feasible Mechanisms in Two-Sided Crowdsensing Markets: ..."

Xiang Liu et al. (2023)

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DOI: 10.1109/TMC.2022.3201260

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type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2024-02-01

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Xiang Liu, Chenchen Fu, Weiwei Wu, Minming Li, Wanyuan Wang, Vincent Chau, Junzhou Luo:
Budget-Feasible Mechanisms in Two-Sided Crowdsensing Markets: Truthfulness, Fairness, and Efficiency. IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 22(12): 6938-6955 (2023)

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