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Publication search results
found 33 matches
- 2009
- Rabah Amir, Robert J. Aumann, James Peck, Myrna Holtz Wooders:
Introduction to the Special Issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Martin Shubik. Games Econ. Behav. 65(1): 1-6 (2009) - Rabah Amir, Francis Bloch:
Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games. Games Econ. Behav. 65(1): 7-24 (2009) - Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour:
Strong price of anarchy. Games Econ. Behav. 65(2): 289-317 (2009) - Aloisio Araujo, Luciano Irineu de Castro:
Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values. Games Econ. Behav. 65(1): 25-48 (2009) - Jonas Björnerstedt, Andreas Westermark:
Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities. Games Econ. Behav. 65(2): 318-338 (2009) - André Casajus:
Outside options, component efficiency, and stability. Games Econ. Behav. 65(1): 49-61 (2009) - Gabrielle Demange:
The strategy structure of some coalition formation games. Games Econ. Behav. 65(1): 83-104 (2009) - Amrita Dhillon, Alexander Herzog-Stein:
Games of status and discriminatory contracts. Games Econ. Behav. 65(1): 105-123 (2009) - Theo S. H. Driessen, Cheng-Cheng Hu:
A note on equivalence of consistency and bilateral consistency through converse consistency. Games Econ. Behav. 65(2): 644-648 (2009) - Pradeep Dubey, Dieter Sondermann:
Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly). Games Econ. Behav. 65(1): 124-141 (2009) - Dino Gerardi, Richard P. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite:
Aggregation of expert opinions. Games Econ. Behav. 65(2): 339-371 (2009) - Isabel Grilo, Jean-François Mertens:
Cournot equilibrium without apology: Existence and the Cournot inverse demand function. Games Econ. Behav. 65(1): 142-175 (2009) - Brit Grosskopf, Alvin E. Roth:
If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design. Games Econ. Behav. 65(1): 176-204 (2009) - Luis A. Guardiola, Ana Meca, Justo Puerto:
Production-inventory games: A new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games. Games Econ. Behav. 65(1): 205-219 (2009) - Sergiu Hart:
Proposals to host the Fourth World Congress of the Game Theory Society. Games Econ. Behav. 65(1): 287 (2009) - Sergiu Hart:
Proposals to host the Fourth World Congress of the Game Theory Society. Games Econ. Behav. 65(2): 649 (2009) - Ángel Hernando-Veciana:
Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids. Games Econ. Behav. 65(2): 372-405 (2009) - Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Emma Moreno-García:
Walrasian analysis via two-player games. Games Econ. Behav. 65(1): 220-233 (2009) - Josef Hofbauer, Jörg Oechssler, Frank Riedel:
Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case. Games Econ. Behav. 65(2): 406-429 (2009) - Leonidas C. Koutsougeras:
Convergence of strategic behavior to price taking. Games Econ. Behav. 65(1): 234-241 (2009) - Nathan Larson:
Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 65(2): 430-460 (2009) - Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano:
Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley-Shubik index. Games Econ. Behav. 65(1): 242-255 (2009) - Paulo Klinger Monteiro:
First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution. Games Econ. Behav. 65(1): 256-269 (2009) - Theo Offerman, Andrew Schotter:
Imitation and luck: An experimental study on social sampling. Games Econ. Behav. 65(2): 461-502 (2009) - Mário R. Páscoa, Abdelkrim Seghir:
Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes. Games Econ. Behav. 65(1): 270-286 (2009) - Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters:
Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models. Games Econ. Behav. 65(2): 503-515 (2009) - Vlasta Pokladniková, Muhamet Yildiz:
Moderation of an ideological party. Games Econ. Behav. 65(2): 516-537 (2009) - Amnon Rapoport, Tamar Kugler, Subhasish Dugar, Eyran J. Gisches:
Choice of routes in congested traffic networks: Experimental tests of the Braess Paradox. Games Econ. Behav. 65(2): 538-571 (2009) - Pedro Rey-Biel:
Equilibrium play and best response to (stated) beliefs in normal form games. Games Econ. Behav. 65(2): 572-585 (2009) - Dezsö Szalay:
Contracts with endogenous information. Games Econ. Behav. 65(2): 586-625 (2009)
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