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ORCID4th SAGT 2011: Amalfi, Italy
- Giuseppe Persiano:
Algorithmic Game Theory, 4th International Symposium, SAGT 2011, Amalfi, Italy, October 17-19, 2011. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 6982, Springer 2011, ISBN 978-3-642-24828-3
Invited Talks
- Bruno Codenotti:
Computational Game Theory. 1 - Ning Chen, Xiaotie Deng
:
Computation and Incentives of Competitive Equilibria in a Matching Market. 2-6
Session 1: Auctions and Advertising
- Asaph Arnon, Yishay Mansour:
Repeated Budgeted Second Price Ad Auction. 7-18 - Yossi Azar, Ety Khaitzin:
Prompt Mechanism for Ad Placement over Time. 19-30 - Patrick R. Jordan, Mohammad Mahdian, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Erik Vee:
The Multiple Attribution Problem in Pay-Per-Conversion Advertising. 31-43 - Marco Comi, Bhaskar DasGupta, Michael Schapira, Venkatakumar Srinivasan:
On Communication Protocols That Compute Almost Privately. 44-56
Session 2: Quality of Solutions
- Noam Berger, Michal Feldman, Ofer Neiman, Mishael Rosenthal:
Dynamic Inefficiency: Anarchy without Stability. 57-68 - Orit Arzi, Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb:
Throw One's Cake - and Eat It Too. 69-80 - Bruno Escoffier, Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot:
The Price of Optimum in a Matching Game. 81-92 - Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein:
Pareto Optimality in Coalition Formation. 93-104
Session 3: Externalities
- Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Orestis Telelis:
Externalities among Advertisers in Sponsored Search. 105-116 - Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Christina Lee, Anthony Chong, Babak Hassibi, Adam Wierman:
Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets. 117-129 - Oskar Skibski:
Steady Marginality: A Uniform Approach to Shapley Value for Games with Externalities. 130-142
Session 4: Mechanism Design
- Elias Koutsoupias:
Scheduling without Payments. 143-153 - Shaili Jain, David C. Parkes:
Combinatorial Agency of Threshold Functions. 154-165 - Lisa Fleischer, Zhenghui Wang:
Lower Bound for Envy-Free and Truthful Makespan Approximation on Related Machines. 166-177 - Navendu Jain, Ishai Menache, Joseph Naor, Jonathan Yaniv:
A Truthful Mechanism for Value-Based Scheduling in Cloud Computing. 178-189
Session 5: Complexity
- Panagiota N. Panagopoulou, Paul G. Spirakis:
Random Bimatrix Games Are Asymptotically Easy to Solve (A Simple Proof). 190-199 - Vittorio Bilò, Marios Mavronicolas:
Complexity of Rational and Irrational Nash Equilibria. 200-211 - Krzysztof R. Apt, Evangelos Markakis:
Diffusion in Social Networks with Competing Products. 212-223
Session 6: Network Games
- Michael Brautbar, Michael J. Kearns:
A Clustering Coefficient Network Formation Game. 224-235 - Long Tran-Thanh, Maria Polukarov, Archie C. Chapman, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jennings:
On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Integer-Splittable Weighted Congestion Games. 236-253 - Pascal Lenzner:
On Dynamics in Basic Network Creation Games. 254-265
Session 7: Pricing
- Eyal Gofer, Yishay Mansour:
Pricing Exotic Derivatives Using Regret Minimization. 266-277 - Elliot Anshelevich, Ameya Hate, Koushik Kar:
Strategic Pricing in Next-Hop Routing with Elastic Demands. 278-289
Session 8: Routing Games
- Roee Engelberg, Michael Schapira:
Weakly-Acyclic (Internet) Routing Games. 290-301 - Vincenzo Bonifaci, Mahyar Salek, Guido Schäfer:
Efficiency of Restricted Tolls in Non-atomic Network Routing Games. 302-313 - Evdokia Nikolova, Nicolás E. Stier Moses:
Stochastic Selfish Routing. 314-325
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