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13th SAGT 2020: Augsburg, Germany
- Tobias Harks, Max Klimm:

Algorithmic Game Theory - 13th International Symposium, SAGT 2020, Augsburg, Germany, September 16-18, 2020, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 12283, Springer 2020, ISBN 978-3-030-57979-1
Auctions and Mechanism Design
- Mete Seref Ahunbay

, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta:
Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding. 3-16 - Ioannis Anagnostides, Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos

:
Asymptotically Optimal Communication in Simple Mechanisms. 17-31 - Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty

, Ayumi Igarashi, Yair Zick
:
Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations When Valuations Don't Add Up. 32-46 - Giannis Fikioris, Dimitris Fotakis:

Mechanism Design for Perturbation Stable Combinatorial Auctions. 47-63
Congestion Games and Flows over Time
- Vittorio Bilò

, Cosimo Vinci
:
Congestion Games with Priority-Based Scheduling. 67-82 - Eirini Georgoulaki, Kostas Kollias, Tami Tamir:

Equilibrium Inefficiency in Resource Buying Games with Load-Dependent Costs. 83-98 - Yiannis Giannakopoulos

, Diogo Poças
:
A Unifying Approximate Potential for Weighted Congestion Games. 99-113 - Jonas Israel

, Leon Sering
:
The Impact of Spillback on the Price of Anarchy for Flows over Time. 114-129 - Hoang Minh Pham, Leon Sering

:
Dynamic Equilibria in Time-Varying Networks. 130-145 - Marc Schröder

:
Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games with Altruistic/Spiteful Players. 146-159
Markets and Matchings
- Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger, Rolf Niedermeier:

Bribery and Control in Stable Marriage. 163-177 - Jochen Könemann, Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Natig Tofigzade:

Approximating Stable Matchings with Ties of Bounded Size. 178-192 - Prem Krishnaa, Girija Limaye

, Meghana Nasre, Prajakta Nimbhorkar
:
Envy-Freeness and Relaxed Stability: Hardness and Approximation Algorithms. 193-208
Scheduling and Games on Graphs
- William Brown, Utkarsh Patange

:
Targeted Intervention in Random Graphs. 211-225 - Yiannis Giannakopoulos

, Alexander Hammerl, Diogo Poças
:
A New Lower Bound for Deterministic Truthful Scheduling. 226-240 - Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Alexandros A. Voudouris

:
Modified Schelling Games. 241-256 - Shaul Rosner, Tami Tamir:

Race Scheduling Games. 257-272
Social Choice and Cooperative Games
- Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski

, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Rolf Niedermeier:
Line-Up Elections: Parallel Voting with Shared Candidate Pool. 275-290 - Bruno Escoffier, Olivier Spanjaard, Magdaléna Tydrichová:

Recognizing Single-Peaked Preferences on an Arbitrary Graph: Complexity and Algorithms. 291-306 - Jochen Könemann, Justin Toth:

A General Framework for Computing the Nucleolus via Dynamic Programming. 307-321 - Mashbat Suzuki, Adrian Vetta:

How Many Freemasons Are There? The Consensus Voting Mechanism in Metric Spaces. 322-336

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