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18th SAGT 2025: Bath, UK
- Ron Lavi
, Jie Zhang
:
Algorithmic Game Theory - 18th International Symposium, SAGT 2025, Bath, UK, September 2-5, 2025, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 15953, Springer 2026, ISBN 978-3-032-03638-4
Computational and Algorithmic Aspects of Games
- Arnab Maiti, Kevin G. Jamieson, Lillian J. Ratliff:
On the Limitations and Possibilities of Nash Regret Minimization in Zero-Sum Matrix Games Under Noisy Feedback. 3-20 - Yunpeng Li, Antonis Dimakis, Costas Courcoubetis:
On the Effect of Time Preferences on the Price of Anarchy. 21-44 - Vittorio Bilò, Marios Mavronicolas, Paul G. Spirakis, Daniel Windisch:
Mixed Nash Equilibria in Discrete Tullock Contests. 45-62 - Simon Krogmann, Pascal Lenzner, Alexander Skopalik, Tobias Sträubig:
Social Welfare in Battery Charging Games. 63-80 - Simon Dohn, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Asger Klinkby:
Improved Hardness Results for the Clearing Problem in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps. 81-98 - Shani Caduri, Tami Tamir:
Coordination Mechanisms on Unrelated Machines with Arbitrary Priority Lists. 99-116
Facility Location
- Elijah Journey Fullerton, Zeyuan Hu, C. Gregory Plaxton:
Constant-Approximate and Constant-Strategyproof Two-Facility Location. 119-136 - Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Alexandros A. Voudouris:
Constrained Truthful Obnoxious Two-Facility Location with Optional Preferences. 137-155 - Elliot Anshelevich, Jianan Lin, Noah Prisament:
Hotelling-Downs with Facility Synergy: The Mall Effect. 156-172
Fair Division and Resource Allocation
- Václav Blazej, Sushmita Gupta, M. S. Ramanujan, Peter Strulo:
Tractable Graph Structures in EFX Orientation. 175-190 - Alviona Mancho, Evangelos Markakis, Nicos Protopapas:
Fairness Under Equal-Sized Bundles: Impossibility Results and Approximation Guarantees. 191-208 - Georgios Amanatidis, Alexandros Lolos, Evangelos Markakis, Victor Turmel:
Online Fair Division for Personalized 2-Value Instances. 209-227 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Kasper Green Larsen, Sudarshan Shyam:
A New Lower Bound for Multicolor Discrepancy with Applications to Fair Division. 228-246 - Bo Li, Biaoshuai Tao, Fangxiao Wang, Xiaowei Wu, Mingwei Yang, Shengwei Zhou:
When is Truthfully Allocating Chores No Harder Than Goods? 247-264
Markets and Matching
- Frederik Glitzner, David F. Manlove:
Unsolvability and Beyond in Many-to-Many Non-bipartite Stable Matching. 267-285 - José Rodríguez, David F. Manlove:
Course Allocation with Credits via Stable Matching. 286-303
Bayesian Decision Making
- Pieter Kleer, Daan Noordenbos:
Bayesian Optimal Stopping with Maximum Value Knowledge. 307-324 - Martin Hoefer, Tim Koglin, Tolga Tel:
Persuading Agents in Opinion Formation Games. 325-342 - Chun Lau, David Pennock, Daniel Schoepflin:
A Truthful and Accurate Forecasting Competition Mechanism on Bayesian Network Structured Events. 343-360
Mechanism Design and Algorithmic Contracts
- Saeed Alaei, Shuchi Chawla, Zhiyi Huang, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian:
Deterministic Refund Mechanisms. 363-380 - Gal Bahar, Omer Ben-Porat, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Near-Linear MIR Algorithms for Stochastically-Ordered Priors. 381-401 - Georgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Christodoulos Santorinaios, Guido Schäfer, Panagiotis Tsamopoulos, Artem Tsikiridis:
Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions. 402-421 - Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Jacob Skitsko:
Linear Contracts for Supermodular Functions Based on Graphs. 422-438
Computational Social Choice
- Negar Babashah, Hasti Karimi, Masoud Seddighin, Golnoosh Shahkarami:
Distortion of Multi-winner Elections on the Line Metric: The Polar Comparison Rule. 441-464 - Georgios Amanatidis, Elliot Anshelevich, Christopher Jerrett, Alexandros A. Voudouris:
Metric Distortion Under Group-Fair Objectives. 465-482 - Yiling Chen, Jessie Finocchiaro:
Robustness of Voting Mechanisms to External Information. 483-501

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