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ORCID6th WINE 2010: Stanford, CA, USA
- Amin Saberi:
Internet and Network Economics - 6th International Workshop, WINE 2010, Stanford, CA, USA, December 13-17, 2010. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 6484, Springer 2010, ISBN 978-3-642-17571-8
Regular Papers
- Aadithya V. Karthik, Balaraman Ravindran
, Tomasz P. Michalak, Nicholas R. Jennings:
Efficient Computation of the Shapley Value for Centrality in Networks. 1-13 - Susanne Albers, Pascal Lenzner:
On Approximate Nash Equilibria in Network Design. 14-25 - Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb:
The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected Pieces. 26-37 - Yoram Bachrach, Peter B. Key, Morteza Zadimoghaddam:
Collusion in VCG Path Procurement Auctions. 38-49 - Maria-Florina Balcan, Florin Constantin:
Sequential Item Pricing for Unlimited Supply. 50-62 - Felipe Balmaceda, Santiago R. Balseiro, José R. Correa, Nicolás E. Stier Moses:
The Cost of Moral Hazard and Limited Liability in the Principal-Agent Problem. 63-74 - Davide Bilò, Luciano Gualà, Stefano Leucci, Guido Proietti:
Specializations and Generalizations of the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree Game. 75-86 - Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Adam Tauman Kalai, Azarakhsh Malekian, Moshe Tennenholtz:
A Novel Approach to Propagating Distrust. 87-105 - Niv Buchbinder, Kamal Jain, Mohit Singh:
Incentives in Online Auctions via Linear Programming. 106-117 - Ozan Candogan, Kostas Bimpikis, Asuman E. Ozdaglar:
Optimal Pricing in the Presence of Local Network Effects. 118-132 - L. Elisa Celis, Nikhil R. Devanur, Yuval Peres:
Local Dynamics in Bargaining Networks via Random-Turn Games. 133-144 - Tanmoy Chakraborty, Eyal Even-Dar, Sudipto Guha, Yishay Mansour, S. Muthukrishnan:
Selective Call Out and Real Time Bidding. 145-157 - Tanmoy Chakraborty, Eyal Even-Dar, Sudipto Guha, Yishay Mansour, S. Muthukrishnan:
Approximation Schemes for Sequential Posted Pricing in Multi-unit Auctions. 158-169 - George Christodoulou, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Mahmoud Fouz:
Truthful Mechanisms for Exhibitions. 170-181 - George Christodoulou, Annamária Kovács, Rob van Stee:
A Truthful Constant Approximation for Maximizing the Minimum Load on Related Machines. 182-193 - Fan Chung Graham, Stephen J. Young:
Braess's Paradox in Large Sparse Graphs. 194-208 - Vincent Conitzer, Nicole Immorlica, Joshua Letchford, Kamesh Munagala, Liad Wagman:
False-Name-Proofness in Social Networks. 209-221 - Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini, Luca Moscardelli:
Stackelberg Strategies for Network Design Games. 222-233 - Dimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos:
Winner-Imposing Strategyproof Mechanisms for Multiple Facility Location Games. 234-245 - Anupam Gupta, Aaron Roth, Grant Schoenebeck, Kunal Talwar:
Constrained Non-monotone Submodular Maximization: Offline and Secretary Algorithms. 246-257 - Martin Hoefer:
Strategic Cooperation in Cost Sharing Games. 258-269 - Nicole Immorlica, Evangelos Markakis, Georgios Piliouras:
Coalition Formation and Price of Anarchy in Cournot Oligopolies. 270-281 - Yashodhan Kanoria:
An FPTAS for Bargaining Networks with Unequal Bargaining Powers. 282-293 - Sai-Ming Li, Mohammad Mahdian, Randolph Preston McAfee:
Value of Learning in Sponsored Search Auctions. 294-305 - Mohamed Mostagir:
Exploiting Myopic Learning. 306-318 - Uri Nadav, Tim Roughgarden:
The Limits of Smoothness: A Primal-Dual Framework for Price of Anarchy Bounds. 319-326 - Elias Koutsoupias, George Pierrakos:
On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions. 327-338 - Ola Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Near-Strong Equilibria in Network Creation Games. 339-353 - Mahyar Salek, Shahin Shayandeh, David Kempe:
You Share, I Share: Network Effects and Economic Incentives in P2P File-Sharing Systems. 354-365 - Vasilis Syrgkanis:
The Complexity of Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games. 366-377 - Haralampos Tsaknakis, Paul G. Spirakis:
Practical and Efficient Approximations of Nash Equilibria for Win-Lose Games Based on Graph Spectra. 378-390 - Christopher A. Wilkens:
Market Communication in Production Economies. 391-401 - Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer:
Strategy-Proof Voting Rules over Multi-issue Domains with Restricted Preferences. 402-414
Short Papers
- Hessameddin Akhlaghpour, Mohammad Ghodsi, Nima Haghpanah, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Hamid Mahini, Afshin Nikzad:
Optimal Iterative Pricing over Social Networks (Extended Abstract). 415-423 - Nima Anari, Shayan Ehsani, Mohammad Ghodsi, Nima Haghpanah, Nicole Immorlica, Hamid Mahini, Vahab S. Mirrokni:
Equilibrium Pricing with Positive Externalities (Extended Abstract). 424-431 - Yoram Bachrach, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jennings:
The Good, The Bad and The Cautious: Safety Level Cooperative Games. 432-443 - Patrick Briest, Parinya Chalermsook, Sanjeev Khanna, Bundit Laekhanukit, Danupon Nanongkai:
Improved Hardness of Approximation for Stackelberg Shortest-Path Pricing. 444-454 - Chuangyin Dang, Yinyu Ye:
The Complexity of Determining the Uniqueness of Tarski's Fixed Point under the Lexicographic Ordering. 455-461 - Khaled M. Elbassioni, Mahmoud Fouz, Chaitanya Swamy:
Approximation Algorithms for Non-single-minded Profit-Maximization Problems with Limited Supply. 462-472 - Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski:
Approximation Algorithms for Campaign Management. 473-482 - Sungjin Im, Pinyan Lu, Yajun Wang:
Envy-Free Pricing with General Supply Constraints. 483-491 - Ian A. Kash, David C. Parkes:
Impersonation Strategies in Auctions. 492-495 - Sourav Chakraborty, Nikhil R. Devanur, Chinmay Karande:
Market Equilibrium with Transaction Costs. 496-504 - Xi Alice Gao, Yiling Chen:
An Axiomatic Characterization of Continuous-Outcome Market Makers. 505-514 - John Joseph Horton:
Online Labor Markets. 515-522 - Evangelos Markakis, Orestis Telelis:
Discrete Strategies in Keyword Auctions and Their Inefficiency for Locally Aware Bidders. 523-530 - Kim Thang Nguyen:
On (Group) Strategy-Proof Mechanisms without Payment for Facility Location Games. 531-538 - Allan Borodin, Yuval Filmus, Joel Oren:
Threshold Models for Competitive Influence in Social Networks. 539-550 - Scott Duke Kominers, Mike Ruberry, Jonathan R. Ullman:
Course Allocation by Proxy Auction. 551-558 - Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo:
False-Name-Proofness in Facility Location Problem on the Real Line. 559-562 - Vijay V. Vazirani:
Non-separable, Quasiconcave Utilities are Easy - in a Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model (Extended Abstract). 563-570 - Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Yagil Engel:
Average-Case Analysis of Mechanism Design with Approximate Resource Allocation Algorithms. 571-578
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